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Introduction
The incidence of violent conflict between States poses the gravest
threat to the stability and well-being of the world community. In an
increasingly interdependent global system, the consequences of inter-
national conflict can extend far beyond the borders of the disputing
nations.' Given these systemic dangers, the global community has a
profound interest in the peaceful settlement of international disputes.2
Nonetheless, several facts of international life militate against recourse
to peaceful settlement in all situations. In the context of a particular
dispute, a disputant might not perceive peaceful settlement to be in its
best interest. Rarely will a country be willing to sacrifice important
national interests solely for the sake of global security. The emotions
and volatility inherent in conflict situations may inhibit any effort to
resolve a dispute peacefully. As a result, intervention by a third party,
with a general or specific interest in the peaceful resolution of the con-
flict, may be essential to prevent the outbreak of hostilities or to facili-
tate negotiations once fighting has erupted.
t J.D. candidate, Yale Law School.
I. As evidenced by the effects of the Arab oil embargo, precipitated by the Yom Kippur
War, conflict in the Middle East can lead to severe economic dislocations throughout the
world. Localized disputes often adversely affect nations in the immediate vicinity of the
conflict. For example, fighting in Cambodia between forces loyal to Pol Pot and those sup-
ported by Vietnam has led to a continuous flow of refugees into Thailand, thereby straining
the resources of that country. See N.Y. Times, May 10, 1978, at 3, col. 1. In addition, the
presence of these refugees may, in time, draw Thailand into a conflict with Vietnam. See Id,
June 29, 1980, at 6, col. 3. Such a conflict could have far-reaching geopolitical conse-
quences, given U.S. support for the Thai regime and Soviet support of Vietnam. See id,
Jan. 18, 1979, at 3, col. 5.
2. Numerous multilateral treaties have expressed this interest. See, e.g., Hague Conven-
tion for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536
(contracting parties agree to use their best efforts to ensure peaceful settlement of disputes);
Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, art. II, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796 (contracting
parties agree that settlement of all disputes shall never be sought except by peaceful means);
Pact of BogotA, Apr. 30, 1948, art. I, 30 U.N.T.S. 55 (contracting parties agree to have re-
course at all times to peaceful procedures for settlement of disputes). Similarly, the U.N.
Charter obligates Member States to settle their international disputes "by peaceful means in




Mediation is an effective means for expressing and legitimating
third-party interests in peaceful settlement.3 A third-party intermedi-
ary can perform important services in the pursuit of peace. A mediator
can be a catalyst to begin the search for peace and thereafter can pro-
foundly affect the internal dynamics of the settlement process. A medi-
ator can provide the disputants with a political safe harbor for the
transmission and rationalization of the compromises needed for settle-
ment. International mediation operates most easily when all parties to
a dispute are favorably disposed towards peaceful settlement. Contrary
to conventional doctrine on mediation,4 however, the mediator may be
able to function successfully in a less than ideal environment.
Whatever the setting, international mediation can make an important
contribution to global peace and stability.
In order to elucidate the particular contribution that international
mediation can make to the maintenance of world peace and the man-
agement of international crises, this Article will examine efforts to me-
diate the Cyprus dispute, one of the most volatile and intractable
conflicts in recent history.5 As a source of additional background mate-
rial on the mediator's role in the settlement process, Henry Kissinger's
3. Mediation is becoming the predominant mechanism for third-party intervention in
the settlement of international disputes. In 1980-81, the Iranian hostage crisis and the con-
flict in Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) have been peacefully resolved with the valuable
assistance of a third-party mediator. Phillip Habib's recent mission to the Middle East and
the Arab League's efforts to mediate the Iran-Iraq war, while not yet (Feb., 1982) completely
successful, provide further evidence of the increasingly important role of international
mediation.
4. Conventional doctrine on international mediation holds that acceptance of mediation
is a voluntary act on the part of the disputants. See, e.g., Hague Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of Disputes, supra note 2, art. 7; F. NORTHEDGE & M. DONELAN, INTERNA-
TIONAL DisPuTEs-THE POLITICAL ASPECTS 299 (1971); A. LALL, MODERN INTERNA-
TIONAL NEGOTIATION 12 (1966); V. PECHOTA, THE QUiET APPROACH 19-20 (1971). This
doctrine ignores the possibility that mediation may be conducted when one of the disputants
concludes that peaceful settlement of the dispute is not in its best interests. As discussed in
this Article, however, the usefulness of a coerced mediation cannot be denied.
5. Since independence from Great Britain in 1959, events on Cyprus have intermittently
posed a significant threat to the peace and security of the eastern Mediterranean region.
Throughout much of this period, the internal dynamics of the Cyprus conflict have led to an
inherently unstable situation. The Cypriot population is composed of Greeks and Turks,
peoples with a long history of animosity. See 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 792 (1972 ed.).
The Greeks are a clear majority of the population and have, on occasion, exploited that
position to the detriment of the Turkish minority. This exploitation has antagonized Tur-
key, which considers itself the guardian of the security of the Turkish Cypriots. Among the
three nations directly involved in this dispute, Turkey is clearly the dominant military
power. See notes 64 & 102 infra. The combination of provocative behavior on the part of
the Greek Cypriot majority coupled with Turkey's military superiority and fervent desire to
protect the Turkish Cypriots has made Cyprus a powderkeg throughout much of its history
as an independent state, and has on several occasions brought Turkey and Greece to the
brink of war. See text accompanying notes 51-63, 90-94, 139-43 infra.
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mediation of the Middle East 6 dispute immediately following the Yom
Kippur War will also be reviewed.
I. Identity of the Mediator
In any given conflict, there are often several actors in the world com-
munity that can serve as mediator; several factors determine which is
chosen. Mediation may be performed under the auspices of the United
Nations, regional security organizations, or by any number of willing
nations. In certain situations, the disputants may perceive a particular
third party to be a natural choice to serve as mediator. The choice of
an otherwise natural mediator may be circumscribed by perceptions of
that party's impartiality and objectivity. In some cases, the choice of a
mediator may be based upon a rational assessment of the influence and
effective power that the mediator can bring to the mediation arena. A
careful consideration of these factors should indicate the party most
suited to a given mediation effort.
The context and history of a particular dispute may lead to a percep-
tion that a certain third party is a natural and appropriate mediator.
Great Britain's early diplomatic efforts to defuse the Cyprus dispute
were based on this perception. In late 1963, Cypriot President
Makarios proposed that the Cypriot constitution be amended in such a
way as to dilute the political rights of the Turkish minority. This action
precipitated violent clashes between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. As
co-guarantor of Cypriot independence and integrity, Great Britain7 as-
sumed the responsibility of seeking a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
Britain promptly called on Greece and Turkey to join in an appeal to
Makarios to end the fighting. As a result of Britain's diplomatic efforts,
the three governments extended their joint good offices in an effort to
6. Like Cyprus, the Middle East has frequently erupted into violent conifict. Arabs and
Jews have a long history of antagonism. This history of strife has helped to produce an
atmosphere of distrust that permeates this region. See Even-Zohar, The Image of the Enemy:
An Exploration of Some Psychological.Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict as They Affect Pol-
icy, INTfL PROBS., Sept., 1974, at 32, 34-36. Since the founding of Israel in 1948, this mutual
suspicion has led to four major wars between Israel and the Arab states. In light of its
strategic, economic, and political importance, the Middle East has been an area of active
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union since the mid-1950's. See gen-
eraly Oden, The Great Powers, Israel and the United Nations, INT'L PROBS., Jan., 1974, at
291; Yishar, Origins of the American Invol'ement in the Middle East, INT'L PROBS., Jan.,
1974, at 336. As a consequence of this competition, conffict in the Middle East poses a
potentially grave threat to the public order of the world community.
7. Under the terms of the 1960 treaty entered into in order to facilitate Cypriot indepen-
dence, Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey agreed to guarantee the constitutional and territo-
rial integrity of Cyprus. See Treaty of Guarantee, Aug. 16, 1960, Great Britain-Greece-




resolve the difficulties that had precipitated the crisis.8 Britain's swift
response helped to establish an uneasy ceasefire and paved the way for
subsequent negotiations between the parties. While the negotiations
failed to produce a political settlement of the underlying issues, Brit-
ain's actions temporarily reduced the danger of a civil war that could
have led to direct fighting between Greece and Turkey.9
Similarly, Henry Kissinger's mediation of the 1974 Syrian-Israeli
disengagement, performed during his tenure as Secretary of State, was
accepted by the parties as a natural and appropriate settlement effort.
Kissinger's previous success in negotiating a disengagement of the
Egyptian and Israeli forces clearly influenced this perception. Efforts
to negotiate the Syrian-Israeli disengagement centered around Kis-
singer's role as mediator. Though the disputing parties never explicitly
recognized the centrality of Dr. Kissinger's role, no effort was made to
return to the Geneva Conference table, originally established as the
locus for Arab-Israeli negotiations, or to substitute another method of
negotiation for Kissinger's mediation. This can be attributed, in part,
to a perception that Kissinger's mediation of the Syrian-Israeli disen-
gagement was a natural extension of his earlier successful efforts.
As the preeminent world organization charged with maintaining
world peace, the United Nations is often considered a natural party to
conduct international mediation. Mediation performed under the aus-
pices of the U.N. usually is undertaken by the Secretary-General or his
official representative. U.N. mediation efforts have successfully
defused tensions built up in the course of many international dis-
putes.10 These efforts are most often successful when the political and
military balance strongly predisposes the disputants towards settle-
ment." U.N. mediation has not been particularly successful in facili-
tating a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus or Middle East disputes. In
large part, this failure has resulted from the conflicts' political and mili-
tary features that have not predisposed the parties to seek a peaceful
8. Letter dated Jan. 8, 1964 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council, 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp.
(Jan.-Mar. 1964) 16, U.N. Doc. S/5508 (1964).
9. 24 FACTS ON FILE 3 (1964).
10. See generally V. PECHOTA, supra note 4, at 22-27, 45-47.
11. Darwin, Mediation and Good Offices, in INTERNATIONAL DIsPuTES-THE LEGAL
ASPECTS 82, 92 (1972). A predisposition to settle is particularly important to the success of
U.N. mediation as the U.N. mediator generally has no effective power over the behavior of
the disputants. In the absence of this control, a fundamental willingness to settle on the part
of both sides can be crucial. See text accompanying notes 64-67, 102-06, 148-52 infra.
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settlement of the underlying issues.12
A third party, which might otherwise be viewed as an appropriate
mediator, may not be acceptable as such if perceived as biased. While
the U.N. might ideally be envisioned as a forum without bias in any
given dispute, reality does not necessarily conform to this ideal. When
this divergence occurs, the usefulness of U.N. mediation may be effec-
tively undermined. During the period preceding the Yom Kippur War,
the various organs of the U.N. took a number of actions that, from an
Israeli perspective, demonstrated an institutional bias in favor of the
Arab position.' 3 This led Israel to believe that the U.N. could not be
counted on to deal with the Middle East dispute in an equitable man-
ner. 14 Accordingly, Israel sought to minimize the role of the U.N. in
the settlement efforts following the Yom Kippur War.'
5
The United States, on the other hand, made a concerted effort,
throughout the Yom Kippur War, to appear as evenhanded as possible.
During the course of the war, the United States sought to prevent a
clear military victory by either the Israelis or the Arabs. 16 In the early
stages of the war, in marked contrast to the Soviet Union's efforts on
behalf of Egypt and Syria, the United States did not engage in signifi-
cant resupply operations to further the Israeli effort. On the contrary,
the United States resupply efforts were deliberately moderate. The
U.S. undertook a massive resupply operation only when it became evi-
dent that the Soviet Union could not be persuaded to curb its supply
efforts and that a quick Israeli victory, as originally expected, was
r i
12. For a briefsdescription of the political and military features of these conflicts that
have militated against peaceful settlement, see text accompanying notes 5-6 supra.
13. In April, 1973, Palestinian terrorists attacked the Israeli embassy in Nicosia, Cyprus.
In retaliation, Israeli commandos attacked the Beirut headquarters of Al Fatah. The Secur-
ity Council passed a resolution condemning the Israeli attack without explicitly mentioning
the Palestinian operation. S.C. Res. 332, 28 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 8, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/29 (1974). The absence of an evenhanded denunciation prompted the U.S. to
abstain. See 28 U.N. SCOR, (1708th mtg.) 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1708 (1973). Likewise, in
July, 1973, the Security Council drafted a resolution strongly deploring Israeli occupation of
territories occupied following the 1967 conflict and reaffirming the rights of the Palestinians,
Draft Resolution, U.N. SCOR, Supp. (July-Sept. 1973) 20, U.N. Doc. S/10974 (1973). The
United States vetoed this resolution on the grounds that it threatened the search for peace in
the area. For an explanation of the U.S. veto, see 69 DEP'T STATE BULL. 272 (1973) (re-
marks by U.S. Ambassador Scali). From the Israeli perspective, these actions clearly under-
mined the appearance of U.N impartiality.
14. See, e.g., 28 U.N. SCOR, (1708th mtg.) 15-17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1708 (1973) (remarks
of Israeli delegate to the U.N., Tekoah, prior to vote on Resolution 332, decrying absence of
U.N. impartiality on the Middle East situation).
15. Sheehan, Step by Step in the Middle East, 22 FOREiGN POL'Y 1, 30 (1976); M. KALB
& B. KALB, KisSINGER 522 (1974).




The clearest American effort to demonstrate impartiality occurred
near the end of the war. Following the breakdown of the first U.N.
sponsored cease-fire, Israel's forces encircled the Egyptian Third Army.
From an Israeli perspective, the destruction of the Third Army made
great sense. The American government believed that such an action
would have brought diplomatic disaster. Accordingly, Washington
pressed Israel to allow supply convoys to reach the Third Army and
threatened to withdraw support if Israel did not do so. Israel re-
sponded by permitting the Third Army to receive much needed food
and medical supplies.18 This action, coupled with U.S. policy during
the earlier stages of the war, provided a clear signal to the Arab world
that the United States was willing to pursue a more evenhanded policy
in the Middle East.19
Perceptions regarding the impartiality of a athird party have also af-
fected the willingness of the disputants in the Cyprus conflict to accept
certain offers of mediation. In June, 1964, the United States and Great
Britain attempted to mediate a political solution to the problems under-
lying the Cyprus dispute. As a preliminary step, both parties sought to
hold separate discussions with Greece and Turkey. After consultations
between Turkish Premier In6nii and President Johnson, the U.S. and
Turkey issued a joint communiqu6 that, in part, endorsed the validity
of the 1960 treaties that had established Cypriot independence.20 A
similar communiqu6 was issued following meetings between In6nti and
British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Following the meeting
with Inonit, Johnson held talks with Greek Premier George Papan-
dreou. After these talks, Papandreou rejected U.S. mediation efforts.
A few days later, Papandreou refused to visit Great Britain to discuss
Cyprus. Ostensibly, the Greek response was based on a belief that
"[n]o one was more competent than the United Nations mediator" to
conduct the negotiation and, given the U.N. efforts, no other party was
needed.21 While this belief may have played a part in the Greek re-
17. Id at 624-25 (1973); M. KALB & B. KALB, supra note 15, at 471; Sheehan, supra note
15, at 12-13.
18. 33 FACTS ON FILE 897 (1973); N.Y Times, Oct. 29, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
19. This effort was apparently successful in demonstrating U.S. impartiality, at least to
Egypt. Compare Sadat, Where Egypt Stands, 51 FOREIGN AFF. 114, 120-22 (1972) (Presi-
dent Sadat blaming United States for Israel's perceived intransigence), with Sheehan, supra
note 15, at 14 (Sadat, immediately following massive U.S. resupply effort, announcing that
U.S. policy in the Middle East had been constructive). See also Even-Zohar, supra note 6, at
43-44.
20. 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 49 (1964).
21. 24 FACTS ON FILE 210 (1964).
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sponse, their answer may also be attributed to the public positions of
both the U.S. and Great Britain regarding the 1960 treaties, which the
Greeks had characterized as no longer valid.22 American and British
acceptance of the Turkish position on the validity of the 1960 pacts
undermined an appearance of impartiality and, in turn, contributed to
the Greek decision to reject their mediative services.
Greek perceptions regarding U.S. impartiality prompted a similar re-
action to American efforts following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in
July, 1974. Both the Greek government and public felt that the United
States had effectively supported Turkey during its invasion.23 This be-
lief generated widespread anti-American sentiment among the
Greeks,24 and, as a result, American offers to mediate the Cyprus dis-
pute were rebuffed by the Greek government.25 While U.S. diplomats
may have thought that they could have played an effective and objec-
tive role in mediating the dispute, Greek perceptions of the U.S. as
biased helped to foreclose this opportunity.26
A rational assessment of the power and influence which a particular
third party may bring to the mediation effort is another important con-
sideration affecting the willingness of the disputants to accept certain
proffered mediative services. While this factor often is overlooked or
22. Id But see note 60 infra.
23. The Greeks believed the United States had supported the Turkish invasion by failing
to exert adequate pressure on Turkey to halt the invasion. N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1974, at 1,
col. 4; id, Aug. 16, 1974, at I, col. 8; Karnow, Foul-up in the Mediterranean, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 7, 1974, at 6, 7. During earlier crises over Cyprus, the U.S. effectively
thwarted a Turkish invasion threat by exerting considerable pressure on the Turks. See text
accompanying notes 66-68, 102-06 infra. U.S. reluctance to pressure Turkey in 1974 was
viewed by the Greeks as a perfidious act of support for Turkey. Karow, Greece in Transi-
tion, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 21, 1974, at 14. The United States, however, may not have
had the effective power necessary to influence Turkish behavior. See text accompanying
notes 148-52 infra.
24. Anti-American sentiment was also fueled by prior U.S. support for the Greek mili-
tary junta responsible for the coup on Cyprus that precipitated the Turkish invasion. This
junta, toppled after the Turkish invasion, was not supported by a broad spectrum of the
Greek populace. 34 FAcTs ON FILE 592-93 (1974). As a result, prior U.S. support of the
junta further aggravated anti-American feelings among the Greek government and public,
see Karow, Greece in Transition, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 21, 1974, at 14; TIME, Sept. 9,
1974, at 34 (interview with Greek Foreign Minister Mavros).
25. According to former Undersecretary of State George Ball, the U.S. offer to mediate
the dispute evinced "an insensitivity beyond belief' given anti-American feelings in Greece.
34 FAcrs ON FILE 678 (1974).
26. Perceptions regarding third-party impartiality do not necessarily determine the will-
ingness of a particular disputant to accept an offer of mediation. At the outset of Cyrus
Vance's 1967 mediation effort, Turkish public sentiment was decidedly anti-American. See
N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1967, at 1, col. 8. Nonetheless, Turkey accepted Vance's mediation.
In large part, this can be attributed to the degree of U.S. influence in Ankara. In effect, the




slighted,27 it can be a significant determinant of the identity of the me-
diator. Egypt's willingness to accept American mediation was, to a sig-
nificant extent, based on a belief that the U.S. could influence Israel
and therefore could facilitate a settlement of the dispute satisfactory to
Egypt. Following the Yom Kippur War, it became evident to the Arab
states, and particularly Egypt, that U.S. influence, rather than Russian
arms, was the key to the achievement of their objectives. An apprecia-
tion of this reality helped to make the Egyptians, and later the Syrians,
most anxious to accept U.S. mediation.
28
In a similar fashion, Greek perceptions of the effective power and
influence that Great Britain could bring to the bargaining table
prompted Greece to dismiss British mediation efforts. Following the
1974 Greek sponsored coup on Cyprus, Great Britain, in accordance
with its obligations under the 1960 treaties, sought to bring Greece and
Turkey together to discuss ways to avert a potential clash. Despite
British efforts, Turkey invaded Cyprus on July 20th, five days after the
coup. Following the invasion, Great Britain persisted in its efforts to
defuse the crisis. Under British sponsorship, Greece and Turkey met in
Geneva to discuss methods of settling the dispute. These talks col-
lapsed within two weeks, however, and Turkey subsequently extended
its control over Cyprus. At this point, it became evident that Great
Britain was incapable of controlling or significantly influencing Turk-




Once identified, the mediator can provide invaluable services in the
effort to reach a peaceful settlement of the dispute. If a settlement is to
be achieved, communication between the disputants is essential. Dur-
ing periods of crisis, however, no party may be willing to initiate the
requisite communication. Popular passions can further inhibit the ini-
tiation of communication between the disputants. In such a situation,
the leaders of the disputing nations may feel restrained by domestic
political pressures from pursuing a moderate approach to the dispute.
30
Intervention by a third party, therefore, may be essential if negotiations
27. See, e.g., 0. YOUNG, THE INTERMEDIARIES 85 (1967).
28. As Kissinger explained, the Egyptians were interested in U.S. mediation as they
could "get weapons from the Soviet Union. But [they could] get territory only from us." M.
KALB & B. KALB, supra note 15, at 502.
29. 34 FACTS ON FILE 701 (1974).
30. See text accompanying notes 33-34, 129-36, 158-61 infra.
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
are to be initiated. The mediator often serves as the primary conduit of
communication between the parties. Cyrus Vance, former Deputy Sec-
retary of Defense and later Secretary of State, performed in this capac-
ity during his mediation of the 1967 Cyprus dispute, as did Henry
Kissinger following the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Once thrust into the settlement arena, the mediator can have a signif-
icant impact on the course of the ensuing negotiations. A mediator can
contribute to the settlement by controlling or influencing the negotiat-
ing agenda. During the early stages of his mission, the mediator should
seek to discern the conditions sine qua non of each side. The mediator
should then try to direct the attention of the parties towards resolving
those immediate issues. This function can be of particular importance
where the injection of certain issues, at an early stage in the negotia-
tions, may lead to a collapse in the settlement efforts.
At the outset of his mediation, Vance convinced the Greeks and the
Turks to concentrate on issues that could be resolved bilaterally with-
out the participation of Cypriot President Makarios. Vance's action
was based on a concern that any effort to expand the negotiating
agenda to include issues requiring Makarios' participation in the early
stages of the talks would have delayed, and possibly doomed, his
peacekeeping mission.31 Similar concerns prompted Henry Kissinger's
successful efforts to keep discussion of the Palestinian issue out of the
initial Israeli-Egyptian disengagement negotiations.3 2 This course of
action may narrow the scope of what can be achieved in the short-term,
and this drawback must be balanced against the risk that another ap-
proach could lead to a complete failure.
The mediator may be able to facilitate settlement by shaping the dis-
putants' perceptions. The mediator is in a position to help each side
fully understand the position of the other, and thereby assist in drafting
proposals that take the opposing positions more fully into considera-
tion. By exposing one side to the views and attitudes of the other, the
intermediary may help elucidate the justifications and rationales be-
hind a proffered proposal. In addition, the mediator may help one side
to begin to understand the constraints under which the opposing side is
operating. For example, during the 1967 Cyprus mediation, Turkish
Premier Demirel was under tremendous political pressure to invade
31. In the early stages of Vance's mediation, Greece and Turkey made efforts to expand
the scope of discussion beyond issues that needed to be resolved in order to achieve a settle-
ment of the immediate crisis. Vance was able to persuade Greece and Turkey to focus on
the essential elements of a bilateral agreement. Interview with Cyrus R. Vance, in New
York City (Apr. 13, 1981).
32. 69 DEP'T STATE BULL. 706 (1973); Sheehan, supra note 15, at 24-25, 27-28.
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Cyprus. In partial response to this pressure, Demirel put forward a
significant last minute condition regarding the internal security ar-
rangements on Cyprus. This condition threatened a complete break-
down in the talks.33 By explaining to the Greeks the political
constraints under which Demirel was operating, Vance helped to elicit
a favorable response to this demand.3 4
During his mediation, the intermediary may be called upon to ex-
plain or interpret a particular proposal made by a party. By clearing
up misunderstandings concerning a proposal, the mediator may enable
a party to make a more considered judgment concerning its acceptabil-
ity. In addition, the mediator can interpret a proposal in such a way as
to make acceptance more likely. In so doing, the mediator should be
careful to avoid distorting the proposal. Otherwise, the mediator's stat-
ure could be compromised and his usefulness diminished.
The mediator may encourage the parties to accept a peaceful solu-
tion by emphasizing the costs of failure. During his "shuttle diplo-
macy" in the Middle East after the Yom Kippur War, Kissinger
impressed upon the Israelis that failure of the negotiations could lead
to renewed hostilities, increased Soviet influence in the Middle East,
and further Israeli isolation in the world community.35 During his
talks with the Turks, Vance discussed the deleterious effects a failure in
the negotiations could have on regional security and Turkey's eco-
nomic well-being.36 A sober analysis of the costs of continued conflict
can enhance the disputants' willingness to accept a peaceful resolution.
The mediator may facilitate peaceful settlement by highlighting ar-
eas where compromise can be reached and by injecting independent
proposals into the negotiations. During Vance's initial round of discus-
sions with Greek and Turkish leaders, each side presented a list of ne-
gotiable issues. These issues clearly exceeded the requirements of an
agreement settling the immediate crisis. To increase the possibility of
short-term success, Vance synthesized the crucial conditions put for-
ward by each side into a settlement package. This distillation was put
forward as Vance's plan and served as the basis for the remaining ne-
33. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1967, at 1, col. 8.
34. Interview with Cyrus R. Vance, supra note 31. In large part, Greek flexibility was
not a function of an appreciation of the domestic pressures facing Premier Demirel. While
this understanding was undoubtedly helpful, the Greek response principally resulted from a
hard-headed calculation regarding the relative power relationship between the two nations.
See-text accompanying notes 81-89, 102 infra.
35. M. KALB & B. KALB, supra note 15, at 527; Sheehan, supra note 15, at 37-39.
36. Interview with Cyrus R. Vance, supra note 31.
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gotiations.37 Similarly, Kissinger formulated an "American plan" for
settlement following his initial round of exploratory discussions with
Israeli and Egyptian leaders. This proposal then served as the focus of
the remaining disengagement talks.38 This procedure has the advan-
tage of allowing each side to avoid the appearance of making a conces-
sion or accepting a proposal thrust on it by the opposing side.
The participation of a third party in the settlement process may pres-
ent the contesting parties with an opportunity to convey private assur-
ances to the opposing side. If one side is reluctant to commit itself
publicly to a particular position, such an opportunity may be particu-
larly important. During the initial disengagement talks, Israel sought
an Egyptian commitment to demilitarize the Suez Canal. Sadat re-
fused to commit his government explicitly to this action, which he be-
lieved to be an affront to Egyptian sovereignty.3 9 By incorporating
agreement on this point into private assurances exchanged between the
parties, Kissinger was able to elicit a significant concession from Egypt
while affording Sadat the opportunity to proclaim that demilitarization
of the canal was "purely a matter of Egyptian sovereignty" and was "in
no way" linked to the disengagement accord.
40
Cyrus Vance faced a similar problem during his mediation of the
1967 Cyprus crisis. After eliciting Greek and Turkish approval of ad-
justments in the internal security arrangements on Cyprus, Vance was
unable to convince Makarios to accede to these agreements. Like
Sadat, Makarios objected to these proposals on the grounds that they
threatened Cypriot sovereignty.41 Because Turkey was adamant that
additional security guaranties for the Turkish Cypriots be forthcoming,
Makarios' recalcitrance threatened to undermine the agreement. For-
tunately, Vance was able to reach an implied understanding with
Makarios regarding steps that would be taken to resolve the crisis. He
conveyed these private assurances to the Turks, thereby salvaging the
agreement.42
Once agreement on substantive issues is achieved, the presence of an
intermediary may afford the disputants a convenient vehicle for an-
nouncing agreement. During the incipient stages of the 1967 Cyprus
dispute, Turkey made several demands on the Greeks. The Turks
backed up their demands with a threat to invade Cyprus and an omi-
37. Id
38. M. KALB & B. KALB, supra note 15, at 535-36.
39. Id at 534-35.
40. 34 FACTS ON FILE 38 (1974). See generally 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 141 (1974).
41. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1967, at 1, col. 3; id, Dec. 3, 1967, at 1, col. 4.




nous show of force.43 Although the Greeks were willing to accede on
several points, they refused to do so under a Turkish threat of war.
44
To circumvent this potential stumbling block, Vance suggested that an
appeal from U.N. Secretary-General U Thant serve as an umbrella for
the announcement of the settlement agreement.45 A settlement was
thus reached without appearing to humiliate the Greeks. To avoid the
appearance of an Israeli or Egyptian capitulation, the announcement of
the initial Israeli-Egyptian troop limitation agreement was handled in
much the same manner.46 Arguably, such an arrangement is merely a
public relations gesture. Nonetheless, public perceptions of national
honor are legitimate concerns of national leaders. Consequently, the
proffering of this illusion may be an important service in the pursuit of
peaceful settlement through mediation.47
Where the disputants are unwilling to attempt to settle their differ-
ences through direct negotiations, third-party mediation may be an ef-
fective means of facilitating peaceful settlement. A mediator can help
reach a settlement by controlling or influencing the negotiation agenda,
shaping the disputants' perceptions of their opponent's motivations,
emphasizing the costs of continued conflict, and injecting independent
proposals into the negotiations. The presence of a mediator may help
resolve the conflict by restraining the disputants and by presenting the
belligerents with a mechanism for rationalizing and transmitting con-
43. Turkish warplanes made several menacing flights over Cypriot territory during the
early stages of the crisis. See Letter dated Nov. 18, 1967 from the Representative of Cyprus
to the President of the Security Council, 22 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1967) 238, U.N.
Doc. S/8251 (1967). If nothing else, these fights forcefully reminded the Greek Cypriots
that Turkish jets were only 10 minutes from Cyprus, whereas Greek jets would have to fly
hundreds of miles to protect the island and would arrive with nearly empty fuel tanks.
44. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1967, at I, col 6; at 12, col. 1.
45. Interview with Cyrus R. Vance, supra note 31. It is interesting to note that press
reports at the time indicated that Greek Foreign Minister Pipinellis suggested the use of a
U.N. umbrella. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1967, at 2, col. 4. By allowing Pipinellis to claim
credit for this suggestion, Vance may have helped to assure the success of his efforts. See U
Thant, A Quiet United Nations Road to Accord, U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, July, 1970, at
122, 125 (any hint that the mediator might claim credit for a particular development can
almost invariably render his efforts useless).
46. 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 137 (1974); Sheehan, supra note 15, at 32-33.
47. At times, the necessity of using a mediator as a vehicle for communicating accept-
ance of a settlement can transcend the need to maintain public appearances. During the
recent tensions in Lebanon, the United States, with the assistance of Saudi Arabia and other
interested third parties, helped to negotiate a cease-fire between Israeli and Palestinian
forces. As neither Israel nor the P.L.O. recognizes the other party, it became necessary to
announce acceptance of the settlement through the offices of outside parties. See N.Y.
Times, July 25, 1981, at 1, col. 6. Both sides were concerned that direct acceptance of the
cease-fire could be viewed as tantamount to defacto recognition, a consequence both sought
to avoid.
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cessions. In this capacity, a third party can make a significant contribu-
tion to the maintenance of world peace.
III. The Import of Outside Influence and Control
As the previous discussion makes clear, a mediator can provide valu-
able assistance to the parties in the search for a peaceful solution to a
conflict. In certain situations, however, even the most skillful mediator
may be unsuccessful. In the context of any given dispute, there are a
number of factors that affect the willingness of the disputants to accept
peaceful means of conflict resolution. The relative military strength of
the belligerents and the degree of domestic political support for the re-
spective governments have a profound, if not decisive, effect on the
parties' perceptions of the utility of peaceful, as opposed to coercive,
mechanisms of dispute settlement. Shifts in these factors, or in the par-
ties' perceptions thereof, likewise will affect their willingness to resort
to peaceful means of settlement. In addition, the interests at stake in
the dispute and the value each side places on a perpetuation of the
status quo will influence the willingness of a particular party to accept
an offer of mediation. When the combination of these factors leads the
parties to conclude that peaceful settlement is in their best interests, the
probability of a successful mediation effort is significantly enhanced.
In some cases, these factors may militate against acceptance of medi-
ation. If a party believes that it possesses superior military or political
strength, it may prefer to use force to further its national interests. This
preference is more likely where vital national interests are at stake in
the' dispute. In this situation, the success of a mediation effort may
depend on external pressures brought to bear on the disputants.48
To a significant extent, the success of the mediation efforts under-
taken to deal with the Cyprus conflict has been a function of external
pressure. Such pressures have been mobilized when third parties have
determined that a continuation of hostilities would be disadvantageous
to all concerned. Often, external assessments of the costs of continued
conflict have contrasted with the parties' own conclusions regarding the
usefulness of continued hostilities. However, if third parties have pos-
sessed and exercised a significant degree of influence over the dispu-
tants, the disputants' predilections have yielded. The degree of
48. In the majority of mediative contexts, the disputants independently have concluded
that peaceful settlement of the dispute is in their best interests. As a result, the parties are
predisposed to accept the assistance of a mediator. This situation is therefore analytically
distinct from cases where the effectiveness of external pressures is a significant determinant




influence wielded by interested third parties has affected both the initial
willingness of the disputants to accept mediation and the ultimate suc-
cess of the settlement effort.
While a general concern for world peace provides some impetus for
third-party intervention, third parties are most apt to take an active
interest in the peaceful settlement of a dispute when they perceive their
security interests to be threatened by continued conflict. American in-
volvement in Cyprus has, in large part, been premised on this percep-
tion. A Cyprus conflict poses the threat of direct confrontation between
Greece and Turkey. Both countries are allies of the U.S., and the pros-
pect of a conflict between them has understandably caused concern in
Washington. Both countries are members of NATO,4 9 and both play
an important role in securing NATO's strategically important southern
flank. Efforts to prevent open warfare between these two putative allies
has been animated, in large part, by Western concerns over the delete-
rious effects such fighting would have on NATO unity in general and
security in the eastern Mediterranean region in particular.50 The
United States has exerted its influence to control the threat that the
Cyprus dispute poses to Western security interests in that strategic re-
gion of the world. The United States' involvement in the Cyprus dis-
pute demonstrates the importance of external influence and control to
peaceful settlement in cases where mediation, or other settlement tech-
niques, would not otherwise be voluntarily accepted.
A. Cyprus, 1963-64 The Initial Crisis Period
U.S. pressure to control the Cyprus dispute was first exercised after
intercommunal fighting erupted on Cyprus following President
Makarios' suggestion, in late 1963, that the Cypriot constitution be
amended. After the initial crisis subsided, Great Britain sought to me-
diate the dispute.5' The talks between Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot
leaders soon reached an impasse, and the dispute was then referred to
the U.N. Security Council.52 The Security Council promptly adopted a
49. See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34
U.N.T.S. 243, Additional Protocol, Oct. 17, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 43, T.I.A.S. No. 2390, 126
U.N.T.S. 350. The danger that conflict between Greece and Turkey poses to NATO was
demonstrated during the 1964 crisis. At that time, both Greece and Turkey withdrew sub-
stantial portions of the forces they had assigned to NATO. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1964,
at 1, col. 2. For a brief period, NATO forces on the southern flank of Europe were signifi-
cantly weakened. More recently, fighting on Cyprus resulted in Greek withdrawal from the
military wing of NATO. See text accompanying note 147 infra.
50. See, e.g., 50 DEP'T STATE BULL. 284 (1964); 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 301, 399 (1964).
51. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
52. Letter dated Feb. 15, 1964 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great
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resolution calling for the introduction of a U.N. peacekeeping force
and the appointment of a mediator to help promote a peaceful settle-
ment of the dispute.53 Before the U.N. force could be introduced, fight-
ing between Greek and Turkish Cypriots intensified. Turkey
threatened to intervene to protect the Turkish Cypriot community.5 4
They relented when a U.N. peacekeeping force landed on Cyprus.55
As a result of this Security Council action, strongly endorsed by the
United States, 56 the Turks were persuaded to call off their invasion
threat and accept U.N. mediation of the dispute.
The introduction of U.N. forces and U.N. mediation temporarily
eased tensions on Cyprus. The mediation effort, however, did not
move quickly towards settlement of the underlying issues. The respite
from violence was shattered in April, 1964 when Greek Cypriots
launched a major attack against Turkish Cypriot positions.5 7 In May,
the Cyprus government announced plans to conscript Greek Cypri-
ots.58 In response to these provocations, Turkey massed a huge inva-
sion fleet along its southern coast. Sensing the danger that this conflict
posed to regional security, the United States acted promptly and force-
fully to avert a crisis. In a stern letter to Turkish President Infntl, Pres-
ident Johnson warned the Turks against invading Cyprus and
threatened to withhold NATO assistance in the event that the Soviet
Union intervened on the side of Cyprus. Consequently, Turkey called
off its invasion.59
After the June crisis abated, efforts to mediate the dispute contin-
Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council, 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp.
(Jan.-Mar. 1964) 66, 67, U.N. Doc. S/5543 (1964).
53. S.C. Res. 186, 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1964) 102, U.N. Doc. S/5575 (1964).
54. Letter dated Mar. 13, 1964 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-Gen-
eral, 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1964) 135-38, U.N. Doc. S/5596 (1964).
55. N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1964, at 3, col. 1.
56. 50 DEP'T STATE BULL. 465-66 (1964).
57. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the operations of the
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Apr.-June 1964) 87,
89, U.N. Doc. S/5671 (1964); N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1964, at 1, col. 6.
58. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1964, at 1, col. 7.
59. Id, June 6, 1964, at 1, col. 4; id, Jan. 14, 1966, at 12, col. 1. The Turks had good
cause to be concerned that the Soviet Union might intervene to defend Cypriot sovereignty.
While the Soviets have no special affinity for the Cypriots, they are reluctant to see this non-
NATO country come under the dominance of a NATO ally. See Letter dated Feb. 8, 1964
from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the President of the
Security Council, 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1964) 56, 57, U.N. Doc. S/5534, Annex
(1964). This strategic consideration prompted several expressions of Soviet support for Cyp-
riot sovereignty and pledges of Soviet support in the event of foreign intervention on Cy-
prus. See, e.g., id; Letter dated Aug. 10, 1964 from the representative of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics to the President of the Security Council, 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (July-
Sept. 1964) 155, U.N. Doc. S/5873 (1964); N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1964, at 39, col. 3. As a
result of this support, a Soviet attack was not an unforeseeable consequence of a Turkish
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ued.60 Tensions escalated when, in August, violent intercommunal
clashes were renewed. Turkish warplanes then attacked Cyprus.
Makarios responded by threatening to launch an all out attack against
Turkish Cypriot positions if Turkish air strikes continued.6' Calm was
restored to the island when Turkey and Cyprus accepted a U.N. Secur-
ity Council cease-fire call,62 a course of action strongly supported by
the United States.
63
Absent U.S. pressure, the eastern Mediterranean likely would have
erupted into open warfare. The Cypriot government had continually
provoked the Turks during the 1963-64 crisis and Turkey was highly
motivated to exploit its dominant military position, vis-47-vis Greece
and Cyprus,64 in order to respond to Cypriot provocations and to guar-
antee the security of the Turkish Cypriots. A Turkish invasion, how-
ever, posed a significant threat to NATO unity and regional security
interests. From an American viewpoint, protection of the NATO se-
curity alliance was the paramount interest at stake in the dispute.65 Ac-
cordingly, the U.S. pressured Turkey into abandoning its invasion
plans and, in effect, coerced Turkey into accepting mediation of the
dispute.
The U.S. was able to dissuade Turkey from taking advantage of its
invasion. This fear, coupled with the threat of withdrawal of NATO support in the event of
a Soviet attack, obviously had a sobering effect on the Turkish leadership.
60. In July, 1964, President Johnson appointed former Secretary of State Dean Acheson
to help mediate the dispute, ostensibly by assisting the U.N. mediator. N.Y. Times, July 4,
1964, at 1, col. 4. Both the Greeks and Turks accepted Acheson's mediation. The Greeks
relented from their earlier refusal to accept U.S. mediative assistance, expressed just one,
month prior to that date. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra. Suspicions were voiced
at the time that the earlier refusal was based on a Greek need to avoid the appearance of
capitulating to U.S. pressures after the U.S. had publicly adopted the Turkish position re-
garding the validity of the 1960 treaties. See N.Y. Times, June 29, 1964, at 3, col. 1.
61. N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1964, at 1, col. 8.
62. Letter dated Aug. 10, 1964 from the Prime Minister of Turkey to the President of the
Security Council, 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (July-Sept. 1964) 158, U.N. Doc. S/5875 (1964);
Telegram dated Aug. 10, 1964 from the President of Cyprus to the Secretary-General, 19
U.N. SCOR, Supp. (July-Sept. 1964) 160, U.N. Doc. S/5876 (1964).
63. 51 DEPT' STATE BULL. 318 (1964). While Turkey clearly intended to protect the
Turkish Cypriots, by force if necessary, it abandoned this course of action in the face of the
Security Council call, backed up by the threat of formidable U.S. sanctions.
64. For a comparison of the relative military strength of the belligerents, see N.Y. Times,
Aug. 10, 1964, at 12, col. 8.
65. In addition to the threat to NATO unity and regional security, the Cyprus conflict
entails other risks to United States security interests. Given the Soviet interest in the dis-
pute, and Moscow's expressions of support for Cypriot sovereignty, see note 59 supra, this
conflict could escalate into a major East-West confrontation. See 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 301
(1964). In addition, conflict on Cyprus presents the Soviet Union with an opportunity to
increase its influence in this strategic region of the world. See 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 399,
477 (1964). These factors help explain the intensity of U.S. pressures on Turkey. See text
accompanying notes 57-59 supra.
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superior military position because Turkey depended on U.S. support
for its own security. Turkey shares a long border with the Soviet
Union, and these two countries have had a long history of conflict.
66
Soviet forces are far superior to those of the Turks, and Turkey is inca-
pable of independently defending itself should those forces attack.
Turkey depended on U.S. military assistance and the NATO security
umbrella to insure its own security.67 As leader of NATO and Turkey's
major arms supplier, the U.S. was able to exert a considerable degree of
influence and effective control over Turkish behavior. Turkey's depen-
dence on U.S. support outweighed Ankara's deep, emotional interest in
protecting the Turkish minority on Cyprus.
While third-party influence was sufficient to contain the fighting on
Cyprus, the failure of the various mediation efforts to achieve an over-
all settlement of the dispute can be attributed, in large part, to the ab-
sence of effective external pressure in support of a political settlement.
During the course of settlement talks, it was reported that Greece and
Turkey were capable of reaching a compromise solution to the dis-
pute.68 Makarios, however, ever jealous of proposals that threatened
Cypriot sovereignty, was less willing to compromise his positions.
6 9
Makarios effectively sabotaged efforts to mediate the dispute by engag-
ing in provocative acts during the course of the negotiations,70 and by
publicly denouncing settlement proposals during sensitive stages of the
talks.71
Makarios was able to thwart these efforts because he was under no
effective pressure to moderate his position. While Cyprus was depen-
dent, to some extent, on Greece for political and military support, the
Greeks were unable, or unwilling to compel Makarios to accept a polit-
66. Modem conffict between the Russians and Turks goes back to the early 18th century.
See 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 783 (1974 ed.).
67. For a discussion of Turkey's military capabilities, as perceived by U.S. policy mak-
ers, see 50 DEP'T STATE BULL. 709, 897-98 (1964). For a discussion of the extent to which
Turkey depended on U.S. military assistance, see Foreign Assistance Act of 1963: Hearings
on S. 1276 before the Senate Comm on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 638-39
(1963); Foreign Assistance Act of 1964: Hearings on H. 10502 before the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 501-02 (1964).
68. At the outset of Acheson's mediation efforts, see note 60 supra, there was a feeling
that "the interests of Greece and Turkey might not be irreconcilable." Acheson, Cyprus.-
TheAnatomy ofa Problem, 46 CHI. B. REc. 349, 353 (1965). Mr. Acheson submitted pro-
posals to the Turkish and Greek governments that Turkey accepted as a basis for negotia-
tion, see id at 353, and that Greece seemed inclined to accept. N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1964, at
1, col. 6. Unfortunately, Makarios soon shattered the hope for political settlement.
69. N.Y. Times, July 31, 1964, at 4, col. 3; see Id, Aug. 24, 1964, at 1, col. 2.
70. See text accompanying notes 57-59 supra.




ical solution to the dispute.72 In fact, the Greeks contributed to
Makarios' hard-line stance by expressing their willingness to come to
Cyprus' aid in -the event of a Turkish attack.73 While the threat of
Turkish invasion may have motivated Makarios to adopt a more con-
ciliatory posture, this threat was mooted by consistent U.S. efforts to
restrain Turkey. In addition, the Cypriot political position was bol-
stered by expressions of support from the Soviet Union and the United
Arab Republic.74 This political constellation protected Makarios from
external pressures to moderate his stance and compelled Turkey to
withdraw its threat to invade Cyprus without eliciting any guaranties
for the security of the Turkish Cypriot minority.
B. Post 1964 Developments: Turkey's Hand is Strengthened
After the 1963-64 crisis subsided, several unsuccessful efforts were
undertaken to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the underlying polit-
ical issues75 involved in the dispute. In February, 1965, Galo Plaza,
Secretary-General U Thant's personal representative on Cyprus, at-
tempted to bring the Greek and Turkish Cypriots together to seek a
solution. This effort failed as the parties refused to budge from their
established positions. 76 U.N. efforts to mediate the dispute continued,
72. As the Cyprus conflict threatens to weaken NATO and bring Greece into direct con-
frontation with Turkey, Greece has a significant security interest in maintaining peace on
Cyprus. Sensing the potential danger this fighting poses to its own security, Greece exerted a
moderating influence on the Cypriot government during the 1963-64 crisis. See, e.g., N.Y.
Times, May 6, 1964, at 1, col. 2; I d, Aug. 9, 1964, at 28, col. 3. Greek ability to influence the
Cypriot government is limited. Any effort to coerce the Cypriots risks a backlash among
Greek Cypriots and their relatives in Greece. Such a backlash could threaten the political
position of the Greek government itself. Makarios adroitly exploited this linitation in his
efforts to resist outside pressures. See Acheson, supra note 68, at 354-55.
73. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1964, at 28, col. 2; id, Apr. 8, 1964, at 6, col. 7.
74. See note 59 supra; N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1964, at 1, col. 2; id, Sept. 1, 1964, at 8, col.
3.
75. The central disagreement between the parties concerned the structure of the Cypriot
government. The Greek Cypriots, led by Archbishop Makarios, wanted a government that
fully reflected their majority status. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, sought a gov-
ernmental structure that assured them of a significant measure of self-government and polit-
ical security. As reported by the U.N. mediator, these positions were incompatible. See
Report by the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General, 20 U.N.
SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1965) 199, 218-22, U.N. Doe. S/6253 (1965).
76. See id at 223-24. In an effort to break the impasse, Mr. Plaza publicly offered his
opinion regarding the appropriate terms of settlement. Id at 235-52. In so doing, however,
he seriously undermined his effectiveness as an impartial mediator of the dispute. Shortly
after these pronouncements, Turkey accused him of overstepping his authority and de-
manded the termination of his mediation efforts. While defending Plaza's actions, U Thant
acknowledged the negative impact the public declaration had on U.N. efforts to mediate the
dispute. See Exchange of letters between the representative of Turkey and the Secretary-
General, 20 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Apr.-June 1965) 1-7, U.N. Doe. S/6267 & Add. 1 (1965);
N.Y.Times, Apr. 3, 1965, at 1, col. 5. Subsequent efforts by Plaza to continue his mediation
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but little or no progress was made.77 In September, 1967, Greek Pre-
mier Kollias and Turkish Premier Demirel met in an effort to negotiate
a solution to the conflict. This effort also failed to resolve the contested
issues.7
8
During the course of these settlement efforts, several developments
shifted the regional power balance in favor of Turkey. Following the
1963-64 crisis, the Turkish government began to reevaluate its ties with
the Ufiited States in response to recent U.S. action on Cyprus. As part
of this reevaluation, 79 Turkey cautiously sought closer ties with the So-
viet Union.80 Several high-level meetings took place," resulting in a
significant improvement in Turkish-Soviet relations.82 The rapproche-
ment with the Soviet Union helped diminish the fear of a Soviet inva-
sion, thereby increasing Turkish feelings of security.8 3 As a result of
this relaxation of tensions, Turkey was in a stronger political position
to deal with the Cyprus problem.8
4
Internal political problems in Greece further shifted the political bal-
ance in favor of Turkey. After the 1963-64 crisis abated, Greece was
were unavailing, and he resigned as U.N. mediator in December, 1965. See Exchange of
letters between the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus and the Secretary-General, 20 U.N.
SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1965) 542, U.N. Doc. S/7054 (1965).
77. See note 76supra; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation
in Cyprus for the period December 9, 1965 to March 10, 1966, 21 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-
Mar. 1966) 204, 229, U.N. Doc. S/7191 (1966); Report of June 10, 1966, 21 U.N. SCOR,
Supp. (Apr.-June 1966) 154, 193, U.N. Doc. S/7350 (1966); Report of Dec. 8, 1966, 21 U.N.
SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1966) 110, 153, U.N. Doc. S/7611 (1966); Report of June 13, 1967,
22 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Apr.-June 1967) 183, 237, U.N. Doc. S/7969 (1967).
78. N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1967, at 1, col. 4.
79. Turkey's reconsideration of its ties with the United States was further demonstrated
by its announcement, in January, 1965, that Turkey would no longer consider participation
in the U.S.-sponsored multilateral nuclear force. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1965, at 4, col. 6.
80. See, e.g, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1965, at 2, col. 2; Id, Nov. 18, 1965, at 16, col. 1.
81. See id, May 19, 1965, at 17, col. 7; id, Aug. 10, 1965, at 5, col. 2; Id, Dec. 22, 1966, at
13, col. 3; Id, Sept. 20, 1967, at'4, col. 6.
82. As a result of this rapprochement, the Soviet Union extended substantial economic
aid to Turkey. See id, Aug. 21, 1965, at 29, col. 8; id, Dec. 22, 1966, at 13, col. 4.
83. Following a meeting with Soviet Premier Kosygin two months before the 1967
Cyprus crisis, Demirel announced that the last traces of Turkish-Soviet hostilities had been
eliminated. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1967, at 9, col. 1. While this announcement was surely a
diplomatic overstatement, it did reflect the significant improvement in Turkish-Soviet
relations.
84. The Turkish-Soviet rapprochement, and the installation of a right-wing military dic-
tatorship in Greece, see text accompanying notes 85-88 infra, prompted a shift in the Soviet
attitude towards the Cyprus conflict. While the Soviet Union expressed support for Cypriot
sovereignty during the 1967 crisis period, it no longer pledged assistance to Cyprus in the
event of a foreign invasion. In addition, it castigated Greece and Greek military officials on
Cyprus for precipitating the crisis, and it viewed Turkey's military response as an under-
standable reaction to Greek provocations. See Letter dated Nov. 27, 1967 from the repre-
sentative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the President of the Security Council,
22 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1967) 249, U.N. Doc. S/8268 (1967).
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the scene of a political struggle between military and civilian leaders85
that culminated in a military coup d' tat in April, 1967. The coup
significantly undermined both domestic86 and international political
support for the ruling government. The coup was censured publicly by
several Western European nations,8 7 and vehemently criticized by the
Soviet Union.88 Greece's international position was weakened further
when the United States partially suspended military aid in response to
the coup. 9 This extra-constitutional change in government, coupled
with Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union, helped to tip the
political balance in the region decidedly in favor of Turkey. This shift
in the relevant power levels enabled Turkey to pursue its national poli-
cies with less concern about external pressures.
C. 1967: The United States Again Maintains the Peace
Shortly after the coup, events on Cyprus again threatened to draw
Greece and Turkey into direct conflict. In November, 1967, the Greek
Cypriot National Guard, under the leadership of General Grivas, a
passionate proponent of enosis (Cypriot union with Greece), attempted
to assert its right of way in the Turkish section of Ayiostheodorus. 90
Intercommunal violence followed, resulting in the deaths of 24 Turkish
Cypriots and 2 Greek Cypriots. In response to this provocation,91 Tur-
key put its forces on alert and threatened to intervene to protect the
security of the Turkish minority unless additional steps were taken
85. See N.Y. Times, July 16, 1965, at 4, col. 4; id, Oct. 2, 1966, at 20, col. 4.
86. See id, May 14, 1967, at 20, col. 4; id, May 26, 1967, at 9, col. 1; id, May 30, 1967, at
20, col. 1.
87. See id, Oct. 3, 1967, at 1, col. 8; id, Oct. 5, 1967, at 5, col. 3.
88. Id, Apr. 25, 1967, at 3, col. 3.
89. Id, May 17, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
90. Special report of the Secretary-General on recent developments in Cyprus, 22 U.N.
SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1967) 215, 218-19, U.N. Doc. S/8248 & Add. 1-9 (1967).
91. Since the 1963-64 crisis, there had been a number of provocative acts on the part of
the Greek Cypriots. In April, 1965, the Greek Cypriots temporarily blockaded the Turkish
quarter of Nicosia following a clash between Greek and Turkish Cypriots., N.Y. Times,
Apr. 17, 1965, at 2, col. 4. In July, 1965, the Greek Cypriot controlled Parliament passed a
bill that extended the life of the Cypriot government. The term of Turkish representatives,
however, was not extended. At the same time, the Parliament passed a bill that merged the
Greek and Turkish voting rolls, thereby diluting the political strength of the Turkish Cypri-
ots. Id, July 23, 1965, at 2, col. 5. See also id, June 4, 1966, at 8, col. 3. While Turkey
protested these moves, it did not mobilize its forces or make other significant steps towards
military intervention. It is likely that Turkey viewed the developments in November, 1967
as a particularly propitious opportunity to adjust the political balance on Cyprus, by force if
necessary, in light of its recently improved relations with the Soviet Union and Greece's
current isolation in the world community. As these changes caused a shift in the relevant
power levels, the perpetuation of the status quo became less acceptable to the Turks.
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promptly to guarantee their security.92
The threat of imminent war caused a flurry of activity by American,
British, and Canadian diplomats determined to keep the peace. De-
spite these efforts, and the fact that Greece had recalled Grivas in an
effort to ease tensions, the Turkish government and public remained
intent on adjusting the political balance on Cyprus, by forceful inter-
vention if necessary.93 Turkey refused to negotiate with Greece until
this balance had been adjusted. Given the Greek refusal to negotiate
under the threat of a Turkish invasion, many observers believed that
war was inevitable.94
In light of the apparent failure of the earlier diplomatic efforts, Presi-
dent Johnson appointed Cyrus R. Vance to be his personal representa-
tive in an effort to control the dispute.95 Vance96 first visited Ankara
and received assurances from the Turkish government that it would not
attack Cyprus until he had time to meet with Greek leaders. Vance
then began a diplomatic shuttle between Athens and Ankara. Within a
week, he had secured agreement between Greece and Turkey on the
framework for reducing immediate tensions between the two parties.97
92. Special report of the Secretary-General on recent developments in Cyprus, supra
note 90, at 220-21; N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1967, at 14, col. 4.
93. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1967, at 1, col. 8. A spokesman for the Turkish government
announced that "unless the threats to the Turkish population are removed, there is nothing
to talk about. . . . The crisis has reached the point where discussions cannot be tolerated."
Id It seems evident that the Turks were not favorably disposed towards peaceful settlement
of the dispute and were determined, at the inception of the conflict, to achieve their goals by
coercive measures, either through threat or actual invasion.
94. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
95. Id, Nov. 23, 1967, at 1, col. 7.
96. Vance's mission was coordinated with the mediation efforts of U Thant's special
representative, Rolz-Bennet, and NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brossio. All parties
agreed, however, that Vance's efforts should have primacy. This agreement was based on a
shared perception that U.S.-sponsored efforts were likely to be more successful as the United
States possessed greater influence with the parties. Interview with Cyrus R. Vance, supra
note 31.
97. The basic terms of the settlement accepted by Greece and Turkey included
1) prompt withdrawal of Greek and Turkish forces to levels allowed under the 1960 security
treaty; 2) demobilization of Greek and Turkish forces; 3) disarming of all local military
forces, particularly the Greek Cypriot National Guard, and 4) an expansion of the role of
the U.N. peacekeeping forces. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1967, at 26, col. 3. The agreement to
withdraw troops down to the levels allowed under the 1960 treaty was perhaps the most
significant settlement provision. Under the 1960 pacts, Greece was permitted 950 troops on
Cyprus and Turkey was allowed to station 650 soldiers on the island. Since 1963, however,
Greece had infiltrated approximately 7000 soldiers onto Cyprus. .d, Nov. 24, 1967, at 16,
col 3. The presence of these troops made invasion a more costly adventure for Turkey. It is
clear from Turkey's actions during the crisis period, however, that these additional troops
would not have dissuaded Turkey from launching an invasion if no significant Greek con-
cessions had been forthcoming. While the removal of these additional troops served to halt
the Turkish invasion threat in 1967, it made Turkey's subsequent invasion much less costly.
See text accompanying notes 140-47 infra.
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Several of the terms of the proposed settlement required the concur-
rence of Cypriot President Makarios. With the Greek and Turkish
agreement in hand, Mr. Vance then directed his energies towards ob-
taining Makarios' acceptance. In his initial talks with Makarios, Vance
apparently received Cypriot approval of the terms of the proposed set-
tlement.98 After the agreement was announced by Greece and Turkey,
Makarios backed away from support of two elements of the proposed
settlement.99 He viewed the proposals to disband the Greek Cypriot
National Guard and to increase the security role of the U.N.
peacekeeping forces as affronts to Cypriot sovereignty. He refused to
accept these proposals without a U.N. Security Council guaranty
against military intervention in Cyprus. These objections threatened
the entire settlement. °0 Mr. Vance, however, was able to elicit private
assurances from Makarios regarding future measures to be taken to
provide additional security for the Turkish minority. These assurances,
together with the terms agreed to by the parties, were sufficient to keep
the settlement intact.101
To a significant extent, the success of Vance's mediation efforts was a
function of U.S. political control over the behavior of the disputants,
particularly Turkey. As in 1963-64, Turkey was indisputably the domi-
nant military power among the potential combatants.102 The Turkish
populace was highly inflamed, and, in effect, the Turkish government
had declared that the time for talking had passed.10 3 When Vance's
mediation began, the Turks clearly believed that invasion of Cyprus
was in their national interest. Nonetheless, they accepted Vance's me-
diation efforts.
In large part, Vance's mediation efforts were accepted because the
Turks were dependent on U.S. military and political support. While
the recent Turkish-Soviet rapprochement helped to increase Turkey's
feelings of security, this relaxation of tensions occurred against the long
98. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
99. Id, Dec. 3, 1967, at 1, col. 4.
100. In light of Makarios' intransigence, it can be argued that the decision to keep Cy-
prus on the sidelines until agreement between Turkey and Greece had been achieved was
judicious. Had these problems been encountered in the early stages of the negotiations, it is
not unlikely that Turkey, at the height of its war frenzy, would have invaded Cyprus. Dur-
ing the course of the negotiations, however, Turkish emotions had a chance to cool When
Turkey had the opportunity soberly to evaluate the terms of settlement and the costs of
armed intervention, it reached the conclusion that the agreement was in its best interest,
notwithstanding Markarios' objections. But see note 114 infra.
101. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
102. For an evaluation of the relative military strengths of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus,
see N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1967, at 14, col. 8.
103. See note 93 supra.
265
The Yale Journal of World Public Order Vol. 7:244, 1981
history of Turkish-Soviet enmity and was not sufficiently established to
serve as a central foundation of Turkish security.' °4 Turkish security
continued to depend on the NATO alliance.105 As a result, the Turks
were not in a position to refuse the services of the personal representa-
tive of the President of the United States. As Turkey's major ally, the
United States effectively compelled Turkey to accept mediation of the
dispute.106
American influence was sufficient to begin the process of seeking a
peaceful solution to the dispute. As a result of the changes in the polit-
ical and military balance since the 1963-64 crisis, however, the U.S. did
not possess sufficient political power to control the conflict by merely
issuing a strong warning that hostilities should cease. 107 Vance's efforts
took due account of the geopolitical shifts in the region. From the out-
set, his efforts were carefully tailored to the changes in the degree of
U.S. influence. His mediation was orchestrated in such a way as to
capitalize and build on the degree of influence which the U.S. then
possessed.
In marked contrast to U.S. actions during the 1963-64 crisis, the State
Department asserted that Vance was not accompanied by any threats
or pressures on his mission.'08 Despite the absence of public threats,
U.S. pressures were discreetly brought to bear, particularly on Turkey.
The U.S. issued a vague warning that an invasion of Cyprus would
104. See note 66 supra.
105. During its rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Turkey continually emphasized
that these developments did not threaten or contradict its important ties with NATO or the
United States. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1965, at 2, col. 2; id, Nov. 4, 1965, at 3, col. 1;
id, Oct. 13, 1967, at 9, col. 1. Turkish ambivalence about its improved relations with the
Soviet Union represented an implicit acknowledgment of the continued importance of
NATO and U.S. support to Turkish security. See 56 DEP'T STATE BULL. 655 (1967) (re-
marks by Turkish President Sunjay, during visit to United States, noting importance of
NATO and alliance with United States to Turkish security).
106. At the outset of Vance's efforts, the Turks clearly did not welcome U.S. mediation.
Furthermore, the United States had interests in the dispute that favored a result that was
contrary to Turkish perceived interests at the inception of the talks. See note 93 supra. It is
likely that these two factors predisposed Turkey to reject a U.S. offer of mediation. Accord-
ing to conventional doctrine on mediation, see note 4 supra, the U.S. mediation effort there-
fore should have been doomed from the start.
107. Hostile gestures by the Turks continued during the course of Vance's mediation.
See N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1967, at 17, col. 1; Letter dated Nov. 29, 1967 from the representa-
tive of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council, 22 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec.
1967) 258, U.N. Doc. S/8278 (1967).
108. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1967, at 1, col. 7. In light of the inflamed Turkish passions
and the diminution of U.S. influence, a return to the public heavy-handedness exhibited
earlier could have endangered Vance's peace keeping efforts. The fact that President John-
son deemed it appropriate to send a trusted personal emissary, rather than a terse warning
through diplomatic channels, also reflected U.S. recognition of its dwindling influence with
Turkey and the commensurate need to accord Turkey more respect.
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precipitate a suspension of U.S. military aid to Turkey. 0 9 Vance dis-
cussed this possibility, and the threat to NATO security and foreign
investment in Turkey," 0 with the Turkish leaders."'
Mr. Vance's mediation agenda was likewise affected by the degree of
U.S. influence with the disputants. In the early stages of the mediation,
Mr. Vance directed his efforts towards Greece and Turkey. Greek and
Turkish membership in NATO gave Vance considerable leverage in
Athens and Ankara. 2 Cyprus was not a member of the Atlantic Alli-
ance and did not depend on the United States for military assistance
and security. American influence in Nicosia was therefore minimal.
Only after achieving agreement between Greece and Turkey on the is-
sues immediately involved in the dispute did Vance turn his attention
to Makarios.
When Vance directed his efforts towards Cyprus, an attempt was
made to coordinate external pressure on Makarios to accept the terms
agreed to by Greece and Turkey. During the course of Vance's talks
with the Archbishop, Greece and Turkey officially announced accept-
ance of the settlement. This move was designed to pressure Makarios
to accept the proposed settlement terms.' 13 This tactic back-fired. An-
nouncement of the agreement significantly lessened the threat of a
Turkish invasion. The alleviation of this threat reduced the effective
pressures on Makarios and prompted him to harden his stand.' 14 Uni-
lateral Greek pressures on Makarios to accept the proposals also were
unavailing." 5 In addition, the U.S. and Turkey did not possess any
109. The United States threatened to suspend military aid to Turkey pending a time-
consuming review of Turkish compliance with the terms of the military aid package. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 24, 1967, at 18, col. 3. This measure had been employed following the 1965
clash between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. On that occasion, the United States sus-
pended military aid to both countries. Id, Sept. 8, 1965, at 1, col. 5.
110. In addition to military aid, the United States provided Turkey with a significant
amount of economic aid. See 57 DEP'T STATE BULL. 211-12 (1967). This provided the
United States with an additional measure of influence with the Turkish leaders.
11. Interview with Cyrus R. Vance, supra note 31.
112. At the time of the 1967 crisis, the military and political balance in the region clearly
favored Turkey. In addition, the Greeks were beginning to feel that their commitment to-
wards Cyprus had been too excessive and costly. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1967, at 1, col. 8.
As a result, the Greeks were favorably disposed towards peaceful settlement of the dispute.
Accordingly, U.S. pressures against Greece were not nearly as important in facilitating a
peaceful settlement as those applied against Turkey.
113. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1967, § 1, at 17, col. 4.
114. See id, Dec. 5, 1967, at 1, col. 1. It might be argued that Vance erred in not involv-
ing Cyprus at an earlier stage in the mediation effort. It is possible that Makarios, under
pressure from the threat of imminent Turkish invasion, might have been more willing to
accept the compromise terms agreed to by Greece and Turkey. See id, Dec. 10, 1967, § 4
(The Week in Review), at 4, col. 1. This course of action, however, could have threatened
Vance's immediate goal, a reduction in tension between Greece and Turkey.
115. See note 72 supra. Greek influence with Makarios had been undermined recently
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significant leverage with the Cypriot government. As a result,
Makarios was able to thwart proposals that were negotiated without
Cypriot participation and that he found to be incompatible with Cyp-
riot sovereignty.
During the 1967 crisis, U.S. pressures and influence once again
played a crucial role in securing a peaceful fesolution of the conflict.
Without U.S. restraints, it is likely that Turkey would have invaded
Cyprus, thereby precipitating a disastrous conflict between Greece and
Turkey. U.S. influence opened the door for mediation efforts and pro-
vided the opportunity for peaceful resolution of the dispute. Since
1964, however, shifts in the military and political balance decreased
U.S. influence with the disputants, particularly Turkey. Mr. Vance's
efforts were managed skillfully to reflect this fact. While U.S. pressure
was sufficient to begin the process towards peaceful settlement, it is un-
likely that this influence, without more, would have caused a cessation
of hostilities. Had significant Greek concessions not been forthcoming,
a Turkish invasion of Cyprus would have resulted. Once again, how-
ever, the absence of effective control over Cypriot behavior limited the
scope of the resultant settlement. As a consequence of the political
forces at work at this time, a Turkish invasion of Cyprus was once
again thwarted. Unlike 1963-64, however, Turkey was successful in
eliciting some additional security guaranties for the Turkish Cypriot
minority. 116
D. Post 1967 Developments: Greece and Turkey Pushfor a
Settlement
Following the 1967 crisis, President Makarios began implementing
measures to provide additional security for the Turkish Cypriot com-
munity. These measures helped to ease tensions on Cyprus and to pro-
vide a suitable atmosphere for the performance of U.N.-sponsored
mediation.1 7 Because of the general improvement in the conditions on
Cyprus, Osorio-TafaUf, the U.N. Special Representative on Cyprus, was
as a consequence of disagreement over the leadership of the Greek Cypriot National Guard.
Makarios viewed the presence of General Grivas as a potential threat to his leadership. He
had asked that Grivas be replaced, but the Greeks had refused. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 20,
1966, at 5, col. 1. The Greek decision not to replace Grivas must have caused Makarios to
wonder if the Greeks were sufficiently concerned about his political security. As a result,
this dispute caused a strain in Greek-Cypriot relations and diminished Greek influence with
Makarios.
116. See text accompanying notes 41-42 & note 97 supra.
117. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the
period Dec. 9, 1967 to Mar. 8, 1968, 23 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1968) 217, 233-34,




able to bring the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities to-
gether for direct negotiations." 8 These talks were carried on intermit-
tently for over two years. They failed, however, to achieve any
significant progress towards settlement of the underlying political
issues."19
In 1971, Greece and Turkey became impatient with the progress of
the intercommunal talks. Both countries were interested in developing
closer relations. Progress on this front, however, was inhibited by con-
tinued tensions on Cyprus.' 20 In light of this threat to their respective
security interests, Turkey and Greece began to pressure the Cypriots to
reach a solution to the dispute by threatening to seek their own solution
if the intercommunal talks continued to prove unsuccessful.' 2' Greece
warned Makarios to settle the conflict or face the consequences of fail-
ure alone. 22 While Makarios once again objected to this threat of for-
eign intervention,'1 3 these pressures provided some additional impetus
118. See Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, 23
U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Apr.-June 1968) 189, 208, 210-11, U.N. Doc. S/8622 (1968).
119. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the
period June 8 to Dec. 2, 1968, 23 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1968) 136, 153-57, U.N.
Doc. S/8914 (1968); Report for the period Dec. 3, 1968 to June 2, 1969, 24 U.N. SCOR,
Supp. (Apr.-June 1969) 175, 181-83, U.N. Doc. S/9233 (1969); Report for the period June 3
to Dec. 1, 1969, 24 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1969) 120, 127-28, U.N. Doc. S/9521 &
Add. 1 (1969); Report for the period Dec. 2, 1969 to June 1, 1970, 25 U.N. SCOR, Supp.
(Apr.-June 1970) 190, 197-98, U.N. Doc. S/9814 (1970); Report for the period June 2 to Dec.
1, 1970, 25 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1970) 57, 67-68, U.N. Doc. S/10005 (1970).
As the tensions precipitated by the 1967 crisis began to wane, the parties felt a less urgent
need to reach a political settlement of the underlying issues. According to U Thant, the
passage of time hampered efforts to resolve the dispute. See Report for the period Dec. 3,
1968 to June 2, 1969, supra, at 184. The reduction in tensions also affected the U.S. sense of
urgency concerning the need for a settlement of the dispute. In 1968, Cyrus Vance, and
several other diplomats, went to the State Department and urged the Administration to take
a more active role in seeking a solution to the underlying issues. However, with U.S. atten-
tions directed elsewhere, (e.g., Vietnam), and with the relaxation of overt hostilities on
Cyprus, significant U.S. support for peaceful settlement of the dispute was not forthcoming.
Interview with Cyrus R. Vance, supra note 31.
U.S. failure energetically to pursue a comprehensive settlement of the dispute was to
haunt U.S. policy-makers during the 1974 Cyprus crisis. By pressuring Turkey to forgo
forceful intervention on Cyprus, the United States assumed, at least in Turkish eyes, an
obligation to help resolve the crisis. By failing to fulfill this obligation, U.S. advice and
suggestions lost credibility with the Turks. This loss undermined later U.S. efforts to control
the 1974 crisis. See note 141 infra.
120. In May, 1971, U Thant warned that the lack of progress towards a peaceful settle-
ment of the dispute threatened to lead to an eruption of violence on the island, thereby
endangering the peace and security of the entire eastern Mediterranean region. See Report
of the Secretary-General for the period Dec. 2, 1970 to May 19, 1971, 26 U.N. SCOR, Supp.
(Apr.-June 1971) 50, 58, U.N. Doc. S/10199 (1971).
121. See Report of the Secretary-General for the period May 30, 1971 to Nov. 30, 1971,
26 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1971) 42, 49-50, U.N. Doc. S/10401 (1971).
122. 31 FACTS ON FILE 618 (1971); N.Y. Times, July 7, 1971, at 5, col. 1.
123. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1971, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 2, col. 5; id, Sept. 3, 1971,
at 27, col. 1; 31 FACTS ON FILE 618 (1971).
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to the U.N.-sponsored efforts to negotiate a settlement, led to an expan-
sion of the intercommunal talks, 24 and helped to elicit conciliatory
gestures from the Makarios government.
125
Although the expanded intercommunal talks rekindled optimism
concerning the settlement of the dispute, 26 they failed to make signifi-
cant progress towards resolving the underlyifig political issues. 127 This
failure can, in part, be attributed to Makarios' continued reluctance to
accept any proposal that threatened Cypriot sovereignty. 28 The failure
of the talks was primarily a consequence of the internal political dy-
namics on Cyprus, which militated against the effectiveness of external
pressures.
The political forces on Cyprus were unstable during the course of the
U.N.-sponsored intercommunal talks. While the Makarios government
enjoyed the support of a significant portion of the Greek Cypriot popu-
lation, it was continually being challenged by militant supporters of
enosis. The enosis forces were led by General Grivas, a long-time rival
of Makarios. Grivas, and his supporters, vehemently objected to any
solution to the conflict that did not entail enosis,129 a position that was
anathema to the Turkish Cypriots. 30 The backers of enosis were or-
ganized into an underground army, EOKA-B, and posed a constant
threat to the Makarios administration.'3'
124. The intercommunal talks were expanded to include active participation by U.N.
Special Representative Osorio-Tafall and by representatives from Greece and Turkey. See
Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 121, at 50-5 1. The Cypriots had earlier rejected
Osorio-Tafall's peace efforts. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1971, at 22, col. 8.
125. In January, 1972, Czechoslovakia clandestinely exported a large quantity of arms to
Cyprus. Both Greece and Turkey protested the introduction of these weapons. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 10, 1972, at 8, col. I. As a result of pressure brought to bear upon Makarios, particu-
larly by Greece, Makarios agreed to U.N. control over the illegally imported weapons. See
Special report of the Secretary-General on recent developments in Cyprus, 27 U.N. SCOR,
Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1972) 64, U.N. Doc. S/10564 (1972).
126. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for
the period May 27 to Dec. 1, 1972, 27 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1972) 53, 60-61, U.N.
Doc. S/10843 (1972).
127. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for
the period June 1 to Dec. 1, 1973, 28 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1973) 240, 247-49, U.N.
Doc. S/11137 (1973).
128. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1972, at 2, col. 4; id Feb. 22, 1972, at 3, col. 1. In his
effort to thwart outside pressures for settlement, Makarios enjoyed limited support from the
Soviet Union. See id., July 7, 1971, at 5, col. 1. However, Makarios' most effective support
came from the Cypriot populace. His ability to tap this support made a significant contribu-
tion to his effort to keep outside pressures at bay. See id., Feb. 16, 1972, at 3, col. 5; id, Feb.
26, 1972, at 28, col. 2; id, Mar. 3, 1972, at 10, col. 4.
129. 30 FACTS ON FILE 433 (1970); N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1971, at 51, col. 3.
130. See Letter dated Apr. 10, 1971 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-
General, 26 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Apr.-June 1971) 26, U.N. Doc. S/10174 (1971).
131. In 1970, advocates of enosis attacked Makarios' helicopter shortly after it took off
from the palace in Nicosia. Makarios escaped unhurt. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1970, at 7, col. 1;
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Greek pressures, although putatively designed to support the peace
process, further exacerbated the conditions on Cyprus that threatened
the success of the U.N.-sponsored talks. Greece and Turkey viewed
Makarios as an obstacle to peace settlement. The Greeks, therefore,
made a concerted effort to undermine Makarios' political position.
132
In so doing, the Greeks offered some measure of support for General
Grivas, 133 thereby increasing Makarios' insecurity concerning the con-
tinued viability of his government and aggravating the political insta-
bility in Cyprus.
The threat that the Grivas forces posed to political stability in Cy-
prus severely restricted the negotiating flexibility of the Makarios gov-
ernment. These restrictions became evident in October, 1972, when the
Turks made an important compromise proposal. Turkish Cypriot
negotiators offered to reduce their demands for constitutional guaran-
ties, which Makarios opposed, if the Greek Cypriots renounced
enosis.134 Acceptance of this offer might have broken the impasse in
the U.N.-sponsored settlement talks .35 The presence of armed, impas-
sioned men, fervently in support of enosis, prompted the Makarios gov-
ernment to move cautiously in response to this proposal.
1 36
Cofnsequently, the opportunity was lost. The tension within the Greek
Cypriot community that, in part, was due to policies of the Greek gov-
ernment, undermined Greek and Turkish efforts to pressure the Cypri-
ots to reach a settlement of the dispute, and clearly had a deleterious
effect on the settlement efforts.
137
id, Mar. 10, 1970, at 12, col. 3. Following the assassination attempt, tensions between sup-
porters of enosis and the Makarios government continued to destablize the Cypriot political
environment. See id, Nov. 28, 1971, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3, col. 2; id, Feb. 13, 1972, at
2, col. 4; I d June 11, 1972, at 22, col. 1.
132. See id, Feb. 13, 1972, at 2, col. 4; id, Mar. 12, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
133. Id, Feb. 15, 1972, at 10, col. 5; id, May 6, 1972, at 4, col. 4.
134. Id, Oct. 29, 1972, at 3, col. 2.
135. A significant portion of the Greek Cypriot population felt ambivalent about enosis.
While the Greek Cypriots have a natural affinity for Greece, the attraction of enosis was
tempered by distrust of the Greek military regime. In addition, the Cypriots enjoyed a
greater degree of prosperity than the Greeks. Enosis might have threatened the economic
health of the island. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1972, at 42, col. 4. In a more stable political
environment, these considerations might have prompted Makarios, who also questioned the
value of enosis, to accept the Turkish proposal.
136. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1972, at 3, col. 2; id, Dec. 5, 1972, at 14, col. 1.
137. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the
period Dec. 2, 1972 to May 31, 1973, 28 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Apr.-June 1973) 58, 67, U.N.
Doc. S/10940 (1973). In 1973, the Greeks recognized that the political pressures on
Makarios were having a counterproductive effect upon the settlement talks. As a result, the
Greeks made some effort to bolster the political stability of the Makarios administration.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1973, at 2, col. 1; id, Mar. 9, 1973, at 12, col. 4; id, Aug. 25, 1973, at 12,
col 4. By this time, however, significant damage to the peace process had already occurred.
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The orchestration of Greek and Turkish pressures was further under-
mined by a dispute between Greece and Turkey over mineral rights in
the Aegean Sea. In January, 1973, a significant gas find was reported
in the Aegean. In early 1974, Greece and Turkey began to dispute
ownership of the rights to exploit this portion of the Aegean Sea. The
dispute aggravated the tensions resulting from the Cyprus conflict, and
caused a severe strain in Greek-Turkish relations. 138 This disagree-
ment, and the events that quickly unfolded on Cyprus, brought an end
to Greek-Turkish efforts to pressure the Cypriots to resolve the dispute.
E. 1974: Cyprus Explodes, The United States Loses Control
Shortly after the Aegean Sea rift developed, events on Cyprus once
again raised the threat of war between Greece and Turkey. On July 15,
1974, enosis hardliners, with the support of the Greek government,
139
engineered a coup d' ktat on Cyprus which toppled the Makarios re-
gime. Turkey warned that it would not accept this seizure of power
and reaffirmed its right to intervene to restore the constitutional order
under the 1960 treaty guaranteeing Cypriot independence. 140  Two
days later, Turkish Premier Ecevit flew to Great Britain to discuss ways
to enforce the security guaranties under the 1960 treaties. British ef-
forts were assisted by American Undersecretary of State, Joseph Sisco,
who shuttled between Athens and Ankara in an effort to forestall the
crisis. 141 Despite these efforts, Turkey invaded Cyprus on July 20th.
138. NA". Times, Apr. 16, 1974, at 6, col. 4; Id, May 30, 1974, at 6, col. 1.
139. In January, 1974, General Grivas died. At the time, there was widespread belief
that Grivas' death could facilitate a settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of contin-
ued Cypriot independence, coupled with local autonomy for the Turkish minority. See Id,
Jan. 29, 1974, at 9, col. 1; id, Feb. 20, 1974, at 5, col. 1. Grivas' heir apparent, George
Karousos, expressed an interest in a ieconciliation with the Makarios government. This
opportunity was lost, however, when he was ousted by hardliners who opposed his moderate
approach. Id, Mar. 3, 1974, at 13, col. 1. This event prompted a precipitous decline in
relations between the enosis forces and the Makarios government. In June, Makarios unsuc-
cessfully attempted to purge Greek officers in the Cypriot National Guard who supported
EOKA-B. Id, June 16, 1974, at 4, col. 1. In July, Makarios accused these officers of plotting
to overthrow his government. Id, July 6, 1974, at 2, col. 4. Ten days later, this fear was
borne out. During the course of these internecine disputes, the settlement talks broke down
following a rancorous public debate over negotiating proposals. See Report of the Secre-
tary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period from Dec. 2, 1973 to
May 22, 1974, 29 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Apr.-June 1974) 131, 139-40, U.N. Doc. S/ 11293
(1974).
140. See Letter dated July 17, 1974 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-
General, 29 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (July-Sept. 1974) 26, U.N. Doc. S/11341 (1974); N.Y.
Times, July 17, 1974, at 12, col. 8; 34 FACTS ON FILE 570 (1974).
141. Sisco first went to London and conferred with Turkish Premier Ecevit. Ecevit in-
formed him that Greece must come forward with some immediate concessions or Turkey,
fearing Greece was using delay to build up its position on Cyprus, would invade. N.Y.
Times, July 19, 1974, at I, coL I. Sisco then went to Athens, where he was unable to elicit
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Immediately following the Turkish invasion, the .U.N. Security
Council adopted a resolution calling for a cease-fire. 142 A cease-fire
was instituted on July 22nd. Following the cease-fire, mediation efforts
by the United States and Great Britain elicited formal agreement to
begin negotiations in Geneva to reach a resolution of the conflict.
43
During the course of these negotiations, Turkey steadily increased its
hold over Cyprus. 44 On August 14th, the Geneva talks broke down
following Turkey's refusal to grant a 36-hour recess to allow the Greek
and Greek Cypriot representatives to consult with their respective gov-
ernments over a recent Turkish proposal. Within hours, Turkish forces
launched a major offensive and secured a significant portion of addi-
tional Cypriot territory.145 Greece, while highly motivated to come to
Cyprus' aid, bowed to the realities of the power relationships extant in
the region and announced that it would not go to war with Turkey.
146
In retaliation for an alleged American failure to restrain the Turkish
advances, the Greeks withdrew their armed forces from NATO. 147
After the events on Cyprus unfolded, numerous criticisms were lev-
eled against American policy during the crisis period. The United
States was criticized for not acting forcefully to head off the coup in
Cyprus. The United States was also criticized for failing to express un-
equivocal disapproval of the coup once it took place. Some observors
felt that an American condemnation of the coup, and a promise to work
to restore the Makarios government might have helped to deter a Turk-
ish invasion of Cyprus. Kissinger's rejection of a suggestion, put for-
ward by Henry Tasca, then U.S. Ambassador to Greece, that the Sixth
the needed concessions. In marked contrast to earlier U.S. efforts, Sisco failed to convince
the Turks to afford a little more time to the efforts to reach a peaceful solution of the crisis.
Id, July 20, 1974, at 1, col. 8; 1d., July 21, 1974, at 21, col. 5. Turkey had played by U.S.
rules during the last two crisis periods, and no significant progress had been made towards
settlement of the underlying political issues. The Turks were unwilling to let- this opportu-
nity pass by at the behest of the United States. As Ecevit reportedly told Sisco, "[wle have
done it your way for 10 years. Now we are going to try it our way." Stem, Bitter Lessons, 19
FOREIGN POL'Y 34, 64 (1975).
142. S.C. Res. 353, 29 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/30
(1975).
143. N.Y. Times, July 31, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
144. See id, Aug. 8, 1974, at 3, col. 1.
145. Id, Aug. 13, 1974, at 3, col. 2; id, Aug. 14, 1974, at 1, col. 8; id, Aug. 15, 1974, at 1,
col. 8.
146. For a comparison of Greek and Turkish military strength, see id, July 20, 1974, at
8, col. 3.
147. Id, Aug. 16, 1974, at 1, col. 8. Following the Turkish invasion, the Greek military
junta collapsed and civilian leadership was restored. This change of government was
greeted enthusiastically by the Greek populace. Id, July 24, 1974, at 1, col. 8. This develop-
ment, however, diminished U.S. influence with the Greeks who held the United States in
muted contempt for its previous support of the junta, see note 24 supra.
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Fleet be interposed between Cyprus and Turkey to block a Turkish
invasion was viewed as another lost opportunity to control the conflict.
The U.S. was also criticized for not having pressured Turkey into curb-
ing their territorial ambitions once they had established their presence
on Cyprus. These alleged policy failures were held to have contributed
to the tragic events on Cyprus. 148
While these criticisms are an understandable response to the human
tragedy on Cyprus, they ignore a central feature of successful third-
party intervention. Third-party intervention in support of the peaceful
resolution of international disputes does not operate in a vacuum. The
existing power relationships are a critical variable in determining the
effectiveness of external intervention. In order to be effective, it is often
essential that the third-party actor possess the effective power to control
or influence significantly the behavior of the disputants. In the absence
of a fundamental willingness of the parties to settle the dispute peace-
fully, external intervention, not premised upon effective control, is
likely to be ineffectual. Indeed, it may be counterproductive to the set-
tlement process and may also undermine the national interests of the
potential intervenor. By ignoring the importance of the existing power
relationships, these criticisms mistake form for substance.
Since 1967, there had been a perceptible shift in the regional power
relationships that restricted U.S. ability to compel all parties to accept
mediation of the dispute. The Turkish-Soviet rapprochement, begun in
1964, had continued unabated. 49 This rapprochement led to a signifi-
cant relaxation of tensions between the Soviet Union and Turkey. In
1974, the Turks need not have feared that the Soviet Union would at-
tack in response to a Turkish invasion of Cyprus. On the contrary, the
Soviet Union cautiously supported the Turkish right to protect the in-
dependence and integrity of Cyprus following the Greek-sponsored
coup.1 50 The Turkish-Soviet rapprochement greatly increased Turkish
feelings of security, and, in so doing, markedly reduced Turkish depen-
148. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1974, at 3, col. 5; Humanitarian Problems on Cyprus:
Hearing Before the Subcomm to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees
of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 7 (1973) (remarks of Dr.
Skiotis); Karnow, Foul-up in the Mediterranean, supra note 23, at 7; Stem, supra note 141, at
77-78.
149. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1970, at 3, col. 4; id, Apr. 18, 1972, at 18, col. 1; id, Apr.
24, 1972, at 3, col. 1.
150. Seeid,July 17, 1974, at 12, col. 8;id, July21, 1974, at 1, ol. 8;cf. id July20, 1974,
at 1, col. 6; Letter dated July 23, 1974 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Social-





dence on the United States and NATO.151 The decline of Turkish reli-
ance on foreign guarantors of its own security significantly restricted
U.S. leverage with the Turks.
The relaxation of tensions between Turkey and the Soviet Union
paralleled the general reduction in East-West tensions. While the gen-
eral relaxation in East-West tensions enhanced the security position of
the superpowers, it also weakened their international political domi-
nance. The policy of dktente helped to break down the bi-polar polit-
ical structure of the world. By easing the threat of East-West
confrontation, d&tente served to lessen the significance of bloc alle-
giance as a central feature of the security and foreign policy perspective
of many nations. This reduction in the importance of East-West bloc
allegiance similarly reduced the ability of the superpowers, particularly
the United States, to control, or significally influence, the behavior of
nations that were previously viewed as subordinate client states. As a
consequence, many nations, including Greece and Turkey, were given
a freer hand with which to pursue their national policy objectives.'
52
Although Turkey and Greece became less dependent on the United
States for their own security, and hence less susceptible to U.S. political
dominance, the United States continued to rely on Greek and Turkish
goodwill to enhance U.S. security interests. The United States main-
tains several important military bases in Greece. The most important
of these, at Suda Bay in Crete, serves as the major supply point for the
Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. The Suda Bay airfield is vital
to the service of aircraft carriers operating in the region. The fear of
losing these strategic installations played an important role in curbing
American pressures against the Greeks.'
53
151. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1974, § 4 (Week in Review), at 19, col. 2.
152. For a discussion of the effects of dtente on the ability of the superpowers to control
world events, see Kissinger, MoralPurposes andPolicy Choices, 69 DEP'T STATE BULL. 525,
530 (1973); Humanitarian Problems on Cyprus, supra note 148, at 19 (remarks of Dr. Skiotis).
This increased freedom was manifested during the period preceding the 1974 Cyprus cri-
sis. In early 1974, Turkey formally lifted a 1971 ban on opium poppy cultivation. This
action defied strong United States pressure to retain the ban and congressional threats to
suspend military aid to Turkey if the ban was lifted. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1974, at 40,
col. 1; id, July 10, 1974, at 11, col. 2; Humanitarian Problems on Cyprus, supra note 148, at
33 (statement of Mr. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs). Moreover, during
the Yom Kippur War, both Greece and Turkey permitted the Russians to fly over their
territory during the Soviet supply missions to Egypt. Both countries, however, refused to
permit U.S. supplies en route to Israel to pass through their territory. See 69 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 617 (1973); 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 280-82, 389-91 (1974); N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1973,
at 1, col. 2. The Greek decision to withdraw its forces from NATO's command structure in
response to alleged Western failures to restrain the Turkish drive, see text accompanying
note 147 supra, is another example of the extent to which dbtente had weakened allegiance
to, and dependence on, political structures dominated by the United States.
153. N.Y. Times, July 30, 1974, at 33, col. 2. It is far from certain that intense U.S.
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Significant strategic considerations also curbed U.S. freedom in deal-
ing with Turkey. Administration officials were concerned that intense
American pressures against Turkey could lead to the loss of U.S. mili-
tary facilities in Turkey, facilities that serve as important supply centers
for NATO operations and intelligence outposts for monitoring devel-
opments within the Soviet Union.' 54 To a greater extent, however, U.S.
flexibility was circumscribed by fears of severely damaging United
States-Turkish relations. 55 In light of Turkey's strategic importance, a
deterioration in these relations could pose a serious threat to U.S. se-
curity interests. Such a deterioration could have prompted Turkey to
reevaluate their international political alignment and commitment to
Western security arrangements in general, and NATO in particular. 56
This fear was increased by Soviet efforts to ingratiate themselves with
the Turks.157 The U.S. interest in maintaining close relations with Tur-
key, dictated in large part by legitimate security concerns, restrained
U.S. diplomatic flexibility'vis-iz-vis the Turks.
In addition to the shift in the regional power relationships, the polit-
ical situation in Greece and Turkey during the crisis period com-
pounded American difficulty in controlling events. During Sisco's first
visit to Athens, the Greek government was in complete disarray. 58
The disintegration of the Greek government severely hampered Sisco's
peace mission. The political climate in Turkey also militated against
successful U.S. intervention. Turkish Premier Ecevit headed a shaky
coalition government 59 and was under tremendous domestic pressure
to intervene 60 in response to the Greek sponsored coup. In addition,
there was residual anti-American sentiment among the Turkish popu-
lation in light of prior U.S. intervention in the Cyprus dispute. Given
pressures against Greece could have contained the Cypriot crisis. Given Greece's military
disadvantage vis-it-vis Turkey, see note 146 supra, it is likely that Greece would have favored
a negotiated solution to the dispute. Unfortunately, Greece was not the principal actor in
the drama; Turkey was. In addition, the Greek government was fragmented during the
crucial crisis period, see text accompanying note 158 infra, and was not in a position to
respond to U.S. pressure.
154. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1974, at 9, col. 1. This fear was later borne out. See text
accompanying notes 170-71 & note 171 infra.
155. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1974, at 1, col 8; 71 DEP'T STATE BULL. 354-55 (1974).
156. See text accompanying notes 170-80 infra. During the early stages of the crisis, the
Turks reportedly warned Kissinger that severe pressure by the U.S. against Turkey would
result in the withdrawal of Turkey from the Atlantic Alliance. Karnow, Tough Turkey, THE
NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 5, 1974, at 12, 14. While this statement may have been mere diplo-
matic posturing, the United States could not dismiss lightly the possibility that it was serious.
157. See text accompanying notes 149-51 supra.
158. See N.Y. Times, July 22, 1974, at 13, col. 5; id, July 23, 1974, at I, col. 5.
159. See N.Y. Times, May 5, 1974, at 2, col. 3; id, May 20, 1974, at 8, col. 4.
160. Id, July 19, 1974, at 1, col. 1; id, at 11, col. 7; Id, July 21, 1974, at 21, col. 3.
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this political background, Ecevit was in no position to respond to U.S.
pressures. Had he done so, it is likely that his government would have
fallen and been replaced by one more stridently nationalistic. This cer-
tainly would not have prevented the Turkish invasion plans. It would,
however, have sounded the death knell for any significant U.S. influ-
ence with the Turkish government.
The responsibility for the failure of efforts to control the 1974 Cyprus
crisis can not be placed on the United States. These efforts failed, not
as a result of U.S. procedural blunders or diplomatic oversights, but as
a consequence of changed circumstances. These changes left the dispu-
tants less responsive to U.S. pressures and more willing to pursue na-
tional policies without considering the effects on regional security
arrangements, or U.S. political or military support for their respective
governments. United States policy was premised on a-realistic appreci-
ation of these changed circumstances and the resultant inability of the
United States to control events.
F. Post 1974 Developments
The Turkish invasion of Cyprus soon brought the Ford Administra-
tion into a heated debate with Congress. Several members of Congress
felt that Turkey had violated a legal condition for continued military
assistance by using U.S.-supplied weapons for aggressive purposes. 161
In order to express U.S. displeasure with the Turkish invasion, and in
an effort to compel Turkey to make concessions in the U.N.-sponsored
Cyprus negotiations, several congressmen proposed a suspension of
military aid to Turkey. 162 The Ford Administration vehemently ar-
gued against this course of action. It feared that such an action would
poison the negotiating atmosphere and, more importantly, undermine
U.S. security interests in the eastern Mediterranean. 163 Over strenuous
Administration objections, and several presidential vetoes, 164 Congress
suspended military aid to Turkey in early 1975.165
161. Id, Sept. 6, 1974, at 5, col. 1; id, Sept. 18, 1974, at 7, col. 1.
162. See id, Aug. 29, 1974, at 12, col. 4; id, Sept. 13, 1974, at 7, col. 1.
163. See 71 DEP'T STATE BULL. 739 (1974) (remarks of President Ford). In defending
U.S. arms assistance to Turkey, Secretary of State Kissinger continually stressed that the aid
was not given as a favor to Turkey but rather was an expression of a mutual interest in the
security of Turkey. See 71 DEP'T STATE BULL. 909, 916 (1974); 72 DEP'T STATE BULL. 5
(1975). However, after the Vietnam d&Mbcle, many congressmen were suspicious of military
entanglements, and were, as a result, unwilling to accept this realpolitik rationale.
164. See 71 DEP'T STATE BULL. 655-59 (1974).
165. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1975, at 1, col. 1. An important force behind the arms cutoff
was the potent pro-Greek lobby in the United States. Persons sympathetic to Greece's posi-
tion were able to generate considerable political support. By contrast, Turkey enjoyed lim-
ited political support in the United States. By taking advantage of the American domestic
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While the congressional action may have been well-intentioned, and
perhaps legally required, 166 it was ill-conceived and in-timed. It was
directed against the country that had the greatest stake in the perpetua-
tion of the status quo, and that had the strongest bargaining position
among the parties directly involved. In addition, the suspension of mil-
itary aid was announced during a period of political instability in Tur-
key, thereby making it extremely risky for any Turkish leader to
capitulate to this affront to Turkish honor. 167 As a result, it is not sur-
prising that the suspension of military aid proved to be both counter-
productive to the search for peace and damaging to U.S. security
interests in the region.
Immediately following the suspension of military aid, efforts to nego-
tiate a settlement of the conflict suffered a setback. Turkish Foreign
Minister Esenbel cancelled a meeting with Kissinger, Greek Foreign
Minister Bitsios, and Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders that was to
deal with the Cyprus negotiations.1 68 One week later, the Turkish
Cypriots dealt a significant blow to the settlement efforts by declaring
the establishment of a separate state in the section of Cyprus controlled
by Turkish troops.1 69
In addition to hindering the search for peace, the arms embargo pre-
cipitated a severe strain in Turkish-U.S. relations and compromised
American security interests in the region. Following the suspension,
Turkish and American political leaders engaged in public recrimina-
political environment, the Greek lobby helped to bolster Greece's negotiating position. See
N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1974, at 3, col. 1.
166. Under U.S. law, military aid
shall be furnished solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the
recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures con-
sistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or otherwise to permit the recipient
country to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the
purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security....
22 U.S.C. § 2302 (1976). Military assistance "shall be terminated" if a recipient country uses
the military materials for any purpose not authorized by § 2302. 22 U.S.C. § 2314(d) (1976).
Proponents of the arms embargo successfully argued that these provisions mandated a sus-
pension of military aid to Turkey.
167. See id, Feb. 10, 1975, at 11, col. 1; id, Apr. 2, 1975, at 38, col. 1; id, May 3, 1975, at
31, col. 1. The aid cutoff soon became an issue in Turkish electoral politics, see Id, Aug. 5,
1975, at 9, col. 1. Domestic political pressure prompted Turkish leaders to refuse to make
any concessions in the face of U.S. pressures, see Id, Sept. 11, 1975, at 3, col. 1, and to
retaliate against the American action, see id., July 26, 1975 at 1, col. 6; Id, Aug. 1, 1975, at 3,
col 1. Congressional insensitivity to Turkish political reality served to produce results detri-
mental to the interests of all concerned.
168. Id, Feb. 6, 1975, at 13, col 1.
169. Id, Feb. 14, 1975, at 1, col. 3. While the Greeks were willing to negotiate the issue
of a Cypriot federation, they refused to do so in the face of this Turkish/all accompli. Id,
Feb. 14, 1975, at 3, col. 6. The Turkish Cypriot declaration clearly damaged the negotiating
atmosphere.
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tions against each other.170 In addition, Turkey retaliated against the
aid cutoff by closing several important U.S. military bases. 71 This ac-
tion damaged Western security interests in the eastern Mediterranean
and proved to be a high price for the paltry, if not non-existent, benefits
that the embargo produced.
The Turkish reaction to the aid cutoff prompted a congressional re-
evaluation of the wisdom of that action. In October, 1975, the Admin-
istration convinced Congress to pass a measure partially lifting the
arms embargo. 172 Following the easing of the embargo, Turkey and
the United States reached a four-year agreement that would have al-
lowed U.S. military installations to reopen in return for a pledge of
approximately $1 billion in U.S. grants and loans. 173 Approval of this
agreement was delayed by electoral considerations in the United States
and continued congressional insistence that further U.S. aid be linked
to Turkish concessions on Cyprus.
174
Following the election of President Carter, implementation of the
new agreement was further delayed. In seeming disregard for the
counterproductive effects of the earlier embargo, the Carter Adminis-
tration tried to link future arms aid to Turkish concessions in the settle-
ment talks.175 Once again, the Turks vociferously rejected this
linkage. 76 Turkish political leaders felt that the embargo obstructed
the Cyprus negotiations by increasing the intransigence of the Greek
170. See id, Feb. 5, 1975, at 5, col. I (Turkish Premier Irmak accusing U.S. Congress of
great misunderstanding that will damage U.S.-Turkish cooperation in NATO); id, June 24,
1975, at 1, col. 6 (Kissinger warning Turkey against thinking they are doing the U.S. a favor
by remaining in alliance with U.S.); id, Aug. 20, 1975, at 12, col. 2 (Turkish President
Koruturk attacking "treason" of Turkey's friends and allies).
171. Id, July 26, 1975, at 1, col. 8. The bases that were closed provided the United
States with information about Soviet activity in the southern Soviet Union and the Black
Sea, id, July 30, 1975, at 3, col. 4, and were particularly important for monitoring Soviet
missile deployment and Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements, see 73 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 322-23 (1975); N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1975, at 3, col. 1.
172. Foreign Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-104, 89 Stat. 508 (1975). The propo-
nents'of this measure were animated, in part, by concern for the effect of the embargo upon
the negotiations. However, the principal justification for this action was the need to safe-
guard U.S. security interests. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-500, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in
1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 965, 968. Administration protestations, which previ-
ously fell on deaf ears, were beginning to register with Congress.
173. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
174. Id, Mar. 30, 1976, at 1, col 5.
175. Id, Apr. 20, 1977, at 1, col. 5; Id, Mar. 12, 1978, at 3, col. 4.
176. In late 1977, hope for settlement was rekindled when then opposition leader Ecevit
promised to press for a solution of the Cyprus problem, without waiting for the United
States to resume aid to Turkey, if he regained power. Id, Dec. 15, 1977, at A6, col. 1. Once
returned to the premiership, Ecevit outlined a program partly aimed at settling the Cyprus
problem. Id, Jan. 13, 1978, at A6, col. 2; id, Jan. 18, 1978, at A5, col. I. Hope was quickly
dashed when Premier Ecevit threatened to retract the Turkish proposals on Cyprus in re-
sponse to renewed U.S. public efforts to link the resumption of arms aid with Turkish con-
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Cypriots. 177 In addition, the unstable political climate in Turkey con-
tinued to militate against capitulation to U.S. pressures. 178 In the face
of mounting evidence of the damaging 179 and counterproductive fruits
of U.S. pressures, the embargo was completely lifted in September,
1978.180
The arms embargo was a misguided, if well-intentioned, foreign pol-
icy endeavor. Its enactment reflected a failure to recognize the decline
in U.S. influence with the Turks and the inhibiting effects of political
instability extant in Turkey. In lifting the embargo, the United States
was paying heed to strategic and political realities that had been ig-
nored, with damaging consequences to U.S. security interests.' 8' While
the lifting of the embargo did not immediately lead to a peaceful settle-
ment of the divisive issues in the Cyprus dispute, as could be expected,
it did remove an obstacle to Turkish acceptance of settlement propos-
als.182 In so doing, this action certainly improves the likelihood that a
successful resolution will be found to this contentious imbroglio.
cessions. Id, Mar. 13, 1978, at A2, col. 3. These gratuitous U.S. actions continued to plague
the U.N.-sponsored settlement talks.
177. See id, Mar. 12, 1978, at A2, col. 3; Id, Apr. 20, 1978, at A16, col. I.
178. During the early days of the Carter Administration, Turkey was in the midst of an
electoral campaign. During the campaign, Premier Demirel ruled out any concessions on
Cyprus until after the election. Id, Feb. 23, 1977, at 7, col. 1. The election results gave
neither of the two major parties a strong governing hand. Id, June 7, 1977, at 14, col. 3. As
a result, Turkey went through a period of shaky coalition governments. See Id, July 4, 1977,
at 2, col. 3; Id, Aug. 2, 1977, at 4, col. 3; id, Jan. 1, 1978, at 1, col. 3. Given the importance
of protecting national honor, it is unlikely that any Turkish political leader would have
remained in power if he had appeared to surrender a superior bargaining position in re-
sponse io external pressures. As a result, the absence of a strong government clearly inhib-
ited bold peace initiatives.
179. While the arms embargo remained in effect, strategic U.S. military bases remained
closed, and U.S.-Turkish relations continued to sour. See Id, Nov. 30, 1977, at 11, col. 1
(Turkey threatens to expel all U.S. military forces if the aid package is not passed by early
spring). Furthermore, the Turkish-Soviet rapprochement received additional impetus. See
id, Jan. 12, 1978, at 2, col. 3; id, June 24, 1978, at 3, col. 2.
180. Id, Sept. 27, 1978, at 8, col. 2.
181. The resumption of aid to Turkey helped to repair the earlier damage to U.S. secur-
ity interests. Immediately following resumption of aid, Turkey agreed to reopen U.S. bases,
on a temporary basis. Id, Oct. 4, 1978, at 13, col. 4. In 1980, a new long-term agreement
between the two nations was consummated. Id, Mar. 30, 1980, at 1, col. 1. The ill effects of
the cutoff continued to linger, however, as evidenced by subsequent Turkish refusals to al-
low U-2 flights over Turkish territory to verify Soviet compliance with SALT. Id, May 24,
1979, at A13, col. 6; Id, Sept. 13, 1979, at A8, col. 1.
182. Several months after the embargo was lifted, U.N. Secretary-General Kurt
Waldheim succeeded in convincing Greek and Turkish Cypriots to resume the intercom-
munal talks that had been suspended since 1977. N.Y. Times, May 20, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
While these talks have yet to produce a fundamental resolution of the Cyprus dispute, their




International mediation has become an increasingly, important pro-
cedure for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Where an
outside State or group of States has a particular interest in the peaceful
resolution of a conflict, mediation can be an effective tool to further
these interests. Whether promoting global or national interests in a
peaceful settlement, the third-party mediator can provide the dispu-
tants with invaluable assistance in the search for peace. The initial in-
terjection of a third party may provide the disputants with a much
needed vehicle for communication; something both sides may desire
yet feel inhibited from initiating. Once the initial communication be-
tween the parties has been established, the presence of a third party can
significantly affect the course of the ensuing negotiations. A mediator
can contribute to a peaceful settlement by manipulating the negotiation
agenda to keep the disputants focused on issues that can and must be
resolved. By helping the disputants to appreciate the constraints and
pressures under which the opposing side is operating, by impressing
upon the parties the costs of continued conflict, and by encouraging
conciliatory, or less provocative, behavior on the part of the disputants,
the mediator can foster an atmosphere conducive to peaceful settle-
ment. A third-party intermediary can help to make peaceful settlement
politically palatable by injecting independent proposals into the negoti-
ating arena, by providing the disputants with an opportunity to ex-
change private assurances, and by serving as a neutral vehicle for
announcing settlement. In so doing, the disputants are provided with
an opportunity to make the concessions needed for agreement without
appearing to accept a position thrust on them by the opposing side. An
interested third party who skillfully discharges these mediative services
can make a profound contribution to the maintenance of world peace
and stability.
When discharging these services, several general principles should
guide the mediator's conduct. Perhaps most importantly, the mediator
must recognize that he is dealing with political elites who must placate
their national constituencies. In order to facilitate a settlement, it may
be necessary to assuage these political sensibilities, either by engaging
in a public relations charade i83 or by allowing a particular person to
take credit for certain salutary developments. 184 In addition, the medi-
ator should recognize that the public announcement of proposed settle-
183. See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
184. See note 45 supra.
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ment terms before the initiation of negotiations is likely to weaken a
particular party's political position, thereby frustrating settlement ef-
forts. 85 A demonstrated lack of sensitivity to the political needs of the
parties with whom he is dealing can seriously hinder the mediator's
efforts.
In any settlement context, the mediator must carefully assess the lim-
its on what can possibly be achieved. At the outset of his mission, the
mediator should seek to identify those issues that are ripe for settlement
and those parties the mediator can successfully influence. His initial
efforts should focus on these issues and parties. This strategy may limit
the scope of any short-term settlement. However, once an initial suc-
cess has been achieved, momentum for further settlement may be gen-
erated. The mediator may then be in a position to build on his earlier
successes and expand the settlement efforts to include issues and parties
not previously addressed.18 6
The skill with which the mediator performs his services is an impor-
tant, but hardly determinative, ingredient of success. When the dispu-
tants have independently come to the conclusion that peaceful
settlement of a dispute is the best means to further their respective na-
tional interests, the probability of success is obviously enhanced. In
certain situations, however, the parties to a dispute might not conclude
that peaceful settlement is the best vehicle for furthering their interests.
The willingness to compromise important national interests, in the pur-
suit of a peaceful settlement, is markedly lessened when a nation enjoys
a significant military or political advantage over potential adversaries.
This advantage may lead one party to conclude that coercive settlement
of contested issues is the best mechanism to promote its national inter-
ests. In these circumstances, it is essential that this party's independent
calculus of the utility of coercive means of resolving the dispute be re-
vised if peace is to be maintained. Intervention by a third party that
exercises a degree of effective control over the behavior of this dispu-
tant may be required if mediation, in this context, is to succeed.
The history of the Cyprus dispute vividly demonstrates the poten-
tially crucial relationship between effective third-party control and a
successful mediation effort. Throughout the history of this conflict,
185. Compare text accompanying notes 20-22 and note 76 supra with 69 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 540 (1973) (Henry Kissinger refusing to discuss specific proposals before the initiation
of the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement negotiations). "
186. This strategy was successfully employed by Henry Kissinger in the initial Arab-
Israeli disengagement talks. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra. In 1967, Cyrus Vance
set the groundwork for a similar effort. Unfortunately, the followup to his initial successes




Turkey has been the dominant power among the potential combatants.
In 1963-64 and again in 1967, the calculus of regional power relation-
ships led Turkey to conclude that invasion, or the threat of invasion,
was the preferred method of adjusting the political balance on Cyprus.
A Turkish invasion, however, threatened the United States' security in-
terests in the region. As a result, the United States interceded in both
instances and prompted Turkey to reevaluate the utility of invasion.
By exercising its political control over Turkish behavior, the United
States effectively coerced Turkey into accepting mediation as the vehi-
cle for pursuing its national interests.
Where this effective control has been lacking, efforts to mediate the
Cyprus dispute have enjoyed limited success. By 1974, United States
influence with Turkey had declined significantly. As a consequence,
U.S. efforts to mediate the dispute during the crisis period were un-
availing, and subsequent pressures on Turkey, mobilized in support of
the U.N.-sponsored settlement talks, were both ineffectual and damag-
ing to U.S. security interests. Similarly, the absence of effective exter-
nal control over the actions of the Cypriot government served to limit
the success of the mediation efforts undertaken in 1963-64 and in 1967.
When a party to this conflict has been under no effective pressure to
modify its stance, the success of the mediation efforts has suffered.
The history of the efforts to mediate the Cyprus conflict provides sev-
eral important lessons for the future conduct of international media-
tion. As this history illustrates, the starting point for any mediation
effort must be a careful evaluation of the respective bargaining
strengths of the disputants. This evaluation should give primary con-
sideration to their relative military and political power. In addition,
the potential mediator should consider the interests of third States. If
politically relevant third States have an interest in the conflict, they
may lend political or military support to one side or the other. As the
Soviet support for Cyprus, and later sympathy for Turkey demon-
strates, these external expressions of support can have an important im-
pact on the relative bargaining strengths of the disputants. Lastly, the
potential mediator should consider the value each side places on a per-
petuation of the status quo. The forces of inertia give the party with a
stake in the maintenance of the status quo an important advantage.
This advantageous position was exploited by Cyprus during the early
stages of this conflict and later by Turkey in the post-invasion period.
This evaluation should provide a potential mediator with an important
understanding of which parties are likely to perceive peaceful settle-
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ment of the dispute to be in their best interest and which are likely to be
intransigent should the mediator succeed in initiating negotiations.
If the existing power relationships do not predispose all parties to-
wards peaceful settlement, the potential mediator should consider what
resources he possesses to alter this predisposition. As forcefully
demonstrated by U.S. efforts during 1963-64 and 1967, the mediator
may be able to exert a considerable degree of leverage in support of
peaceful settlement if one, or all, of the disputants is dependent on the
mediator for military, political, or economic support. If the mediator
does not possess any significant degree of leverage with one or both of
the disputants, he should seek to enlist the support of other politically
relevant parties, a tactic tried, albeit unsuccessfully, by Cyrus Vance
with respect to Cyprus in 1967. It should be recognized, however, that
efforts tolpressure the disputants entail risk,187 as evidenced by Tur-
key's retaliation against the United States following the post-invasion
arms embargo. The potential mediator should carefully consider the
limits on his effective control resulting from this potential for
retaliation.
Efforts to pressure the disputants might be further limited by polit-
ical realities in the State attempting to exercise effective control. If a
disputant can enlist the loyalties of potent political forces within the
intervening State, efforts to coerce that disputant towards a peaceful
settlement may be undermined. 88 Indeed, a disputant might be able to
manipulate the policies of the intervening State to its own ends by skill-
fully exploiting political forces within the intervening State. The arms
embargo against Turkey, resulting, in part, from the'activities of the
187. While efforts to coerce the disputants entail special risks, risk is an element in any
mediation effort. Should the mediation fail, the mediator is a convenient scapegoat. See
text accompanying notes 23-24 supra (Greek leaders attacking the United States for support-
ing the Turkish invasion following the failure of U.S. efforts to mediate the 1974 crisis). In
addition, failure can provide evidence that the mediating party is not a formidable presence
in the world arena. See text accompanying note 29 supra (Greece dismissing further British
mediation efforts following failure of Britain's mediation during the 1974 crisis period); Haz-
ard, 7he League of Frightened Men, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 19, 1980, at 17 (Kurt
Waldheim's failure to mediate an end to the Iranian hostage crisis reaffirms the non-impor-
tance of the U.N. Secretary-General in world affairs). In any settlement context, the media-
tor exposes himself to the risk of failure. His willingness to do so must be an element in the
initial decision whether or not to offer his mediative services.
188. In 1963-64, for example, Archbishop Makarios was able to thwart Greek pressures
by appealing to the Greek populace. See Acheson, supra note 68, at 354-55. Similarly,
Henry Kissinger's flexibility in dealing with the Israelis was circumscribed, to varying de-
grees, by the Jewish lobby within the United States. See Sheehan, supra note 15, at 13, 55-
58; cf Emerson, The Petrodollar Connection, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 17, 1982, at 18





U.S. Greek lobby,189 is a most vivid example of this potentiality. The
mediator must assess the effects that domestic political realities will
have on his flexibility in the settlements efforts.
The political atmosphere existing in the disputing nations may also
limit the efficacy of external pressures. If the political environment is
unstable, leaders may feel inhibited from making the concessions nec-
essary for settlement, even if this might otherwise be perceived as ap-
propriate. In 1971-72, President Makarios clearly felt restrained from
responding to Greek and Turkish pressures by the political instability
on Cyprus. Likewise, the political atmosphere in Turkey, following the
embargo, prompted Turkey to resist those pressures adamantly and to
take retaliatory measures arguably contrary to Turkish security inter-
ests. 190 The domestic political climate in the disputing nations should
be an important factor in the mediator's evaluation of the likely success
of efforts to exert pressure towards a peaceful settlement of the dispute.
A scrupulous evaluation of the relative bargaining strengths of the
disputants and the likely efficacy of external pressures will provide the
potential intermediary with an essential understanding of the context of
any peace-keeping mission. This evaluation should indicate the proba-
ble success of any mediation effort and the possible scope of any settle-
ment. It is unrealistic to expect that the resolution of a dispute will
deviate significantly from the relevant power levels. Any effort to co-
erce the parties towards peaceful settlement in contravention of this
reality is likely to be counterproductive and damaging to the interests
of the intervenor, a lesson the United States learned at significant cost
following the arms embargo. Where the relevant power levels militate
against the usefulness of quasi-coercive mediation, discreet and unob-
trusive support for peaceful settlement is likely to be the best path to
follow.191 Where appropriate, however, this form of quasi-coercive
189. See note 165 supra.
190. Despite the Turkish-Soviet rapprochement, the NATO alliance was still an impor-
tant guarantor of Turkish security. See N.Y. Times, June 27, 1975, at 2, col. 3 (Turkish
Foreign Minister Caglayangil noting that Turkey continues to rely on U.S. nuclear umbrella
to guarantee its security and that NATO bases provide important benefits to Turkey). Nev-
ertheless, in the face of tremendous domestic political pressure, the Turkish government felt
compelled to retaliate against the U.S. embargo, thereby weakening an important bulwark
of Turkish security.
191. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus brought the political balance on the island more in
line with the regional power balance. As a partial consequence, stability on the island has
been enhanced. Since the invasion, Cyprus has enjoyed an extended period of relative peace
and calm, despite the existence of some tensions due to the absence of a comprehensive
political solution to the dispute. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
operation in Cyprus for the period June 10 to Dec. 8, 1975, 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec.
1975) 54, 60, U.N. Doc. S/11900 & Add. 1 (1975); Report for the period June 6 to Dec. 6,
1976,31 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1976) 38, 45-46, U.N. Doc. S/12253 & Add. 1 (1976);
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mediation can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of
global stability.
The promotion of community and/or national interests in peace is
the manifest function of quasi- oercive mediation. In addition, this set-
tlement technique serves a less obvious, latent function.192 This form
of mediation obfuscates and legitimates the eiercise of effective control
over a sovereign State. By engaging in quasi-coercive mediation, a
third party is able to inject itself obtrusively into the affairs of an in-
dependent State in order to protect its own interests. The coercion of a
sovereign State, which might be deemed intolerable in other contexts, is
legitimated in the eyes of the global community, when employed to
further a widely accepted global value, the preservation of peace. As a
result, this settlement technique affords a third-party actor with the op-
portunity to manipulate subtly the policies of a sovereign State for its
own purposes, while at the same time receiving the approbation of the
global community. Quasi-coercive mediation therefore is a valuable
diplomatic tool for any State with the will and the means to employ it.
Report for the period June 8 to Nov. 30, 1977, 32 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1977) 79,
84, U.N. Doc. S/12463 & Add. 1 (1977); Report for the period June 1 to Nov. 30, 1978, 33
U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1978) 78, 84, U.N. Doc. S/12946 & Add. 1 (1978); N.Y.
Times, Dec. 26, 1980, at All, col. 1; Id, May 31, 1981, at 5, col. 1. In late 1980, Greece
rejoined the NATO military wing. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1980, at 1, col. 3. It does not appear
that the U.S. arms embargo, or other overt pressures against Turkey, made any significant
contribution to these beneficial developments.
192. For a discussion of the distinction between manifest and latent functions, see R.
MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 61-66 (rev. ed. 1957).
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